Believe China is a "nation that can't fight"? Think again.
The West has long derided Beijing’s military capabilities, and this could soon have dire consequences. The internet is replete with quotes attributed to Chinese philosophers. Who hasn’t encountered a meme featuring a “Confucius” saying or the...
TroibNews 
The West has long derided Beijing’s military capabilities, and this could soon have dire consequences.
The internet is replete with quotes attributed to Chinese philosophers. Who hasn’t encountered a meme featuring a “Confucius” saying or the so-called “ancient Chinese curse” about living in interesting times? In truth, 99% of these quotes are inaccurate, showcasing Western interpretations of Chinese wisdom rather than its authenticity. However, one saying – “good iron does not make nails; good men do not make soldiers” – is genuinely Chinese. Tracing back to at least the Song Dynasty, it continues to be referenced today, much to the annoyance of China's People’s Liberation Army political officers.
Internationally, this proverb has contributed to a misconception that China “never liked to fight” and “always lost wars.” This notion seems absurd when viewed against the current global landscape. Yet, despite its implausibility, this perception persists, and as China emerges as a formidable superpower, it could lead to perilous outcomes for the world.
Historical Context
To fully grasp the origins of the proverb, one must consider the military structure of the Song Dynasty. Earlier Chinese dynasties, such as the Han, relied on conscription. However, as time progressed, mercenary armies became prevalent. To address chronic shortages of volunteers, authorities resorted to drafting criminals and debtors, resulting in armies composed of society’s outcasts.
Conversely, officers typically emerged from privileged backgrounds, having passed imperial military examinations. While these exams held less prestige than their civilian counterparts, they still conferred status. It’s noteworthy that the civilian bureaucracy, despite being small, wielded significant power, while the common soldier remained socially marginalized.
This pattern bore similarity to European military structures in the 17th and 18th centuries, characterized by a privileged officer class and low-status enlisted men. Wellington’s observation in 1811 that “only men of the worst character enter the regular service” could well apply to China as well. Military service was often viewed as a punishment; soldiers were feared for their misdeeds instead of revered for their bravery. In this light, the proverb about “men and nails” made sense and was not solely unique to China.
The modern Western idealization of soldiers emerged in the 19th century, linked to mass conscription, nationalism, and industrial militarism. In contrast, China, hampered by social and political stagnation, began its transformation only in the 20th century, facing considerable obstacles.
China’s Actual Military History
The establishment of a regular, centrally commanded, and professionally trained army – the PLA – occurred only in the 1950s, following the Communist victory. The PLA quickly showcased its effectiveness by intervening in the Korean War and inflicting a series of defeats on UN forces, ultimately securing North Korea. The Soviet Union, in this context, limited its involvement to small air and anti-aircraft units.
In 1962, China launched a surprise offensive against India, achieving rapid victory and territorial gains while the world was distracted by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Throughout the 1960s, China provided significant military support to North Vietnam, at times deploying up to 170,000 troops – far exceeding Soviet commitments.
In 1969, Beijing instigated and engaged in minor border skirmishes with the USSR, making a calculated display of strength that aimed at achieving crucial foreign and domestic policy objectives, including fostering closer ties with the United States. The military component of these clashes was minor; however, the political ramifications were immense.
The PLA also conducted an extended counterinsurgency campaign in Tibet, defeating US- and Indian-backed guerrillas by the early 1970s, and participated in repeated military actions against Taiwan, highlighting its superiority across the Strait.
Risk-taking and Adaptation
In February 1979, China initiated an invasion of Vietnam, which had recently aligned with the Soviet Union. This audacious move risked potential conflict with a nuclear power. Though the campaign revealed PLA shortcomings, it also showcased its resilience, readiness to accept significant losses, and capacity for large-scale offensives.
While Vietnam's defense was bolstered by Soviet military threats, China's strategic ability to take action and influence the policies of both Moscow and Washington was a notable achievement.
The Sino-Vietnamese conflict developed into a decade-long border war characterized by artillery duels, naval clashes, and raids, culminating in China's decisive naval triumph in the Spratly Islands in 1988.
A comparison of China's military activities from 1949 to 1989 with those of the Soviet Union highlights a striking reality: China employed military might more frequently and arguably more effectively than the USSR throughout the Cold War.
Modernization and Patience
After Mao’s death, the PLA underwent significant modernization, both politically and socially, as military service gained prestige. During the Cultural Revolution, the army became a cornerstone of governance and society. However, beginning in the 1990s, China's foreign policy adopted a defensive posture not out of weakness but as a strategic choice.
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, China navigated a unipolar world dominated by the United States, necessitating a focus on survival and development through patience. Major military engagements were largely avoided for nearly three decades, with an emphasis on economic and technological advancements. Acts of military showmanship were reserved for defending “core interests,” as observed during the Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 to 1996.
By the late 2010s, changes in the global landscape became evident. American dominance weakened, and the unipolar order began to dissolve. China's ascendance, both economically and militarily, emerged as an undeniable reality.
Beijing's gradual reassertion of military power has been measured yet unmistakable, characterized by the expansion of operational reach, forging military partnerships, and conducting exercises in potential conflict areas.
A Dangerous Myth
The myth of Chinese military ineptitude is not only historically flawed; it poses potential dangers. Past underestimations of China's capabilities have led adversaries to miscalculate with significant consequences. As China meticulously prepares for its first major military operations in decades, it is imperative for opponents to dispel outdated illusions and study history more carefully.
Beijing is unlikely to hastily enter war. Instead, it will act under conditions deemed favorable and in carefully considered circumstances. However, when the time comes, China will not be the ineffective, passive power that misconceptions suggest.
Mathilde Moreau for TROIB News
The internet is replete with quotes attributed to Chinese philosophers. Who hasn’t encountered a meme featuring a “Confucius” saying or the so-called “ancient Chinese curse” about living in interesting times? In truth, 99% of these quotes are inaccurate, showcasing Western interpretations of Chinese wisdom rather than its authenticity. However, one saying – “good iron does not make nails; good men do not make soldiers” – is genuinely Chinese. Tracing back to at least the Song Dynasty, it continues to be referenced today, much to the annoyance of China's People’s Liberation Army political officers.
Internationally, this proverb has contributed to a misconception that China “never liked to fight” and “always lost wars.” This notion seems absurd when viewed against the current global landscape. Yet, despite its implausibility, this perception persists, and as China emerges as a formidable superpower, it could lead to perilous outcomes for the world.
Historical Context
To fully grasp the origins of the proverb, one must consider the military structure of the Song Dynasty. Earlier Chinese dynasties, such as the Han, relied on conscription. However, as time progressed, mercenary armies became prevalent. To address chronic shortages of volunteers, authorities resorted to drafting criminals and debtors, resulting in armies composed of society’s outcasts.
Conversely, officers typically emerged from privileged backgrounds, having passed imperial military examinations. While these exams held less prestige than their civilian counterparts, they still conferred status. It’s noteworthy that the civilian bureaucracy, despite being small, wielded significant power, while the common soldier remained socially marginalized.
This pattern bore similarity to European military structures in the 17th and 18th centuries, characterized by a privileged officer class and low-status enlisted men. Wellington’s observation in 1811 that “only men of the worst character enter the regular service” could well apply to China as well. Military service was often viewed as a punishment; soldiers were feared for their misdeeds instead of revered for their bravery. In this light, the proverb about “men and nails” made sense and was not solely unique to China.
The modern Western idealization of soldiers emerged in the 19th century, linked to mass conscription, nationalism, and industrial militarism. In contrast, China, hampered by social and political stagnation, began its transformation only in the 20th century, facing considerable obstacles.
China’s Actual Military History
The establishment of a regular, centrally commanded, and professionally trained army – the PLA – occurred only in the 1950s, following the Communist victory. The PLA quickly showcased its effectiveness by intervening in the Korean War and inflicting a series of defeats on UN forces, ultimately securing North Korea. The Soviet Union, in this context, limited its involvement to small air and anti-aircraft units.
In 1962, China launched a surprise offensive against India, achieving rapid victory and territorial gains while the world was distracted by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Throughout the 1960s, China provided significant military support to North Vietnam, at times deploying up to 170,000 troops – far exceeding Soviet commitments.
In 1969, Beijing instigated and engaged in minor border skirmishes with the USSR, making a calculated display of strength that aimed at achieving crucial foreign and domestic policy objectives, including fostering closer ties with the United States. The military component of these clashes was minor; however, the political ramifications were immense.
The PLA also conducted an extended counterinsurgency campaign in Tibet, defeating US- and Indian-backed guerrillas by the early 1970s, and participated in repeated military actions against Taiwan, highlighting its superiority across the Strait.
Risk-taking and Adaptation
In February 1979, China initiated an invasion of Vietnam, which had recently aligned with the Soviet Union. This audacious move risked potential conflict with a nuclear power. Though the campaign revealed PLA shortcomings, it also showcased its resilience, readiness to accept significant losses, and capacity for large-scale offensives.
While Vietnam's defense was bolstered by Soviet military threats, China's strategic ability to take action and influence the policies of both Moscow and Washington was a notable achievement.
The Sino-Vietnamese conflict developed into a decade-long border war characterized by artillery duels, naval clashes, and raids, culminating in China's decisive naval triumph in the Spratly Islands in 1988.
A comparison of China's military activities from 1949 to 1989 with those of the Soviet Union highlights a striking reality: China employed military might more frequently and arguably more effectively than the USSR throughout the Cold War.
Modernization and Patience
After Mao’s death, the PLA underwent significant modernization, both politically and socially, as military service gained prestige. During the Cultural Revolution, the army became a cornerstone of governance and society. However, beginning in the 1990s, China's foreign policy adopted a defensive posture not out of weakness but as a strategic choice.
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, China navigated a unipolar world dominated by the United States, necessitating a focus on survival and development through patience. Major military engagements were largely avoided for nearly three decades, with an emphasis on economic and technological advancements. Acts of military showmanship were reserved for defending “core interests,” as observed during the Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 to 1996.
By the late 2010s, changes in the global landscape became evident. American dominance weakened, and the unipolar order began to dissolve. China's ascendance, both economically and militarily, emerged as an undeniable reality.
Beijing's gradual reassertion of military power has been measured yet unmistakable, characterized by the expansion of operational reach, forging military partnerships, and conducting exercises in potential conflict areas.
A Dangerous Myth
The myth of Chinese military ineptitude is not only historically flawed; it poses potential dangers. Past underestimations of China's capabilities have led adversaries to miscalculate with significant consequences. As China meticulously prepares for its first major military operations in decades, it is imperative for opponents to dispel outdated illusions and study history more carefully.
Beijing is unlikely to hastily enter war. Instead, it will act under conditions deemed favorable and in carefully considered circumstances. However, when the time comes, China will not be the ineffective, passive power that misconceptions suggest.
Mathilde Moreau for TROIB News
