Europe at a Crossroads: A Fragmented Continent Prepares for Trump
The upcoming months will be crucial for the Atlantic alliance as a divided continent grapples with the challenges ahead.
TroibNews 
Donald Trump’s reelection promises to influence perceptions and policies in Europe just as much as in the United States.
Europe is not a monolith; it comprises diverse attitudes and strategies regarding itself and its crucial political, military, and economic partner, the United States. Many nations are increasingly concerned about the prospect of a president who has expressed ambivalence toward traditional alliances, suggested the possibility of shuttering NATO, and threatened trade wars.
To gauge the type of Europe that will welcome Trump next year, I embarked on a post-election journey through three significant capitals: Brussels, the EU’s administrative center; Berlin; and Warsaw, which serves as a frontline outpost bordered by Russia and Ukraine.
In Berlin, much like my observations in Paris earlier in the autumn, I encountered a Europe grappling with its own domestic challenges, seemingly unable to rise to the occasion in the near future. However, both Warsaw and Brussels fostered a serious dialogue regarding the implications of U.S. changes for the European bloc, indicating an understanding of their limitations amid the larger global landscape.
**In Brussels: A Union at the Crossroads**
Belgians, known for their unique sense of humor, demonstrate this on the Rue de la Loi — a street connecting the city’s EU quarter to the royal palace. In front of a long-abandoned plot where a hotel once stood, a faded mural once proclaimed, “The Future Is Europe.” Yet, the future feels uncertain and, perhaps, stagnant. Days after my visit, that mural was removed to facilitate the construction of a new office building. Arriving from Washington, I anticipated that Trump’s election would exacerbate the existing anxiety in Europe. While I found the unease palpable, especially regarding the general malaise, there was also a newfound sense of realism and urgency among senior EU and NATO officials in Brussels.
Trump’s possible return represents a pivotal moment in the long history of transatlantic relations. Fabrice Pothier, the former head of policy planning at NATO, describes one possible future as “the great undocking,” suggesting a widening separation between Europe and America. European ambivalence toward U.S. cultural and national fervors may deepen, alongside an isolationism that raises doubts about America’s commitment to European defense, while protectionism could disrupt vital commercial ties. Conversely, the U.S. may become increasingly disinterested in a Europe perceived as stagnant and lacking innovation.
Historically, even at our lowest points, such as during the Iraq war in 2003, a “great undocking” had never occurred since World War II. In Europe, there remains a strong desire among the political fringes to avert this scenario, including among the traditionally “anti-American” French. However, the relationship must evolve; Europe must adapt as well. If done correctly, this evolution will clarify for America why it’s beneficial to maintain ties with Europe.
There are indicators that this evolution could come to fruition. The leading figures in Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Rutte, adopt a practical approach to the new Trump era. Von der Leyen, who heads the European Commission, eschews the preachiness of past leaders and presents a businesslike demeanor. Rutte, NATO’s new chief, brings fresh energy to the organization and appears to maintain a decent rapport with Trump.
Immediate challenges await. On the Ukraine conflict, Trump’s impending presidency has already fostered a consensus among European and Ukrainian leaders to pursue a resolution in early 2025. The worst-case scenario could involve a Trump peace plan mirroring Vladimir Putin’s proposals, failing to secure a sovereign Ukraine or NATO’s potential involvement. A better scenario would establish a demilitarized zone, leave unresolved questions regarding Ukrainian territories, and provide a protective umbrella for Kyiv, with NATO’s future support and troop presence.
“Biden was so frustrating,” lamented a senior NATO official. “I believe Trump can be better. It cannot go on like this.”
Such frustrations had rarely been expressed before the election. Publicly, Ukrainians and NATO Europeans were grateful to President Joe Biden for rallying support and supplying arms. Nonetheless, there was dissatisfaction regarding Washington’s commitment to securing a Ukrainian victory. The reluctance to firmly support arms shipments condemned Ukraine to a protracted conflict, offering Putin the perception that time favored him.
The future of NATO appears particularly tenuous. Trump has threatened to withdraw from the alliance or undermine it by disregarding the Article 5 commitment to defend allies against attack. However, there seems to be less existential dread at NATO now than there was in 2017, when Trump made such threats. Former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg seemingly convinced Trump of NATO’s “usefulness.” Legislation proposed by Sen. Marco Rubio, who is likely to be the next Secretary of State, seeks to prevent any president from exiting NATO without Senate approval.
“Actually my greatest worry is an ineffective administration in Washington,” said another senior NATO official. “That they go this way or that. The Democrats were like that — they couldn’t make a decision.”
“The immediate concern is what kind of deal they force the Ukrainians to make,” this official added.
An ambitious but feasible approach would involve enhancing military and political support for Ukraine to deter Putin, leading France and Britain—both nuclear powers—to discuss extending security guarantees under any peace agreement. They are cautious about ensuring U.S. backing under Trump’s leadership, recalling memories of the Suez crisis when America effectively abandoned them.
On trade, the anxieties in Brussels are palpable. As the EU’s largest trading partner with the U.S., any aggressive moves by the Trump administration, particularly against China, would impact Europe as they restructure supply chains.
Individuals in positions of power share experiences from Trump’s first term, with some echoing his sentiments. An incoming European Commissioner even outlined a potential deal: The EU could purchase U.S. military equipment and liquefied natural gas in exchange for trade concessions. “We need to think, what goodies do we offer the U.S.?” this official remarked. There’s an evident effort within Brussels to internalize aspects of Trumpism, even without full familiarity with his writings.
“It is in neither European nor American interests to ‘undock,’” stated a second senior NATO official.
To maintain a robust transatlantic relationship, a strong case must be articulated in Trumpian terms. The U.S. military relies on European bases and allies to exert influence in the Middle East and Asia, while American defense manufacturers value the European market, anticipating the deployment of over 600 F-35s by European forces by the decade’s end.
Europe, too, must awaken from its complacency. The post-Cold War period saw a shift in resources from defense to welfare, with the expectation that the U.S. would shoulder their security responsibilities. Europe is undeniably aware of its historical context, from the battlefields of Flanders Fields to the rise of fascism during World War II.
The era of complacency is over. The Ukraine conflict should underscore this reality, especially for Eastern Europe, which has strengthened its militaries and cultivated more competitive economies. The Western part of the continent, however, remains largely in denial, a situation that will become increasingly difficult under Trump’s watch.
**In Berlin: A Crisis of Leadership**
A pressing question for a continent adrift is whether Europe has the leadership necessary to establish a renewed transatlantic relationship with Trump and regain its global standing.
Berlin, a focal point for this inquiry, simultaneously represents both hope and hindrance. Following Trump’s election, Germany’s traffic light coalition fractured, failing to deliver on the promise of a renewed commitment to defense and diplomatic leadership that Chancellor Olaf Scholz touted following the onset of the Ukraine war.
Initially energizing, this dynamic succumbed to bureaucratic inertia and political timidity. Scholz positioned himself as a leader of the status quo, advocating for Ukraine without provoking Russia. In the German context, the notion of “Putinversteher”—the need to understand and empathize with Putin—gained traction once more.
Internationally, Scholz has been perceived as indecisive and ineffective, especially as Europe seeks assertive leadership regarding Ukraine. Many diplomats candidly described his tenure as "a disaster," "hopeless," and "terrible."
Scholz faces significant challenges domestically as well. Germany’s export-driven economic model is faltering amid rising energy costs and heightened competition from China. An aging population compounded by a lack of technological innovation is contributing to a recessionary mindset.
Berlin, now reflective of this grim national mood, stands in stark contrast to its pre-pandemic vibrancy. The city once buzzed with creativity and cultural energy akin to New York. My recent visits revealed a progressively darker atmosphere, with Scholz embodying the stasis.
Germany's “left behind” population, especially in the poorer east, is shifting toward far-right sentiments.
This narrative sounds familiar; Germany grappled with similar challenges two decades ago when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implemented unpopular reform measures that ultimately led to a revival.
The phrase “Waiting for Merz” echoes through discussions in Berlin, Warsaw, and Brussels, referring to Friedrich Merz, leader of the center-right Christian Democrats. After losing a power struggle to Angela Merkel decades ago, he now appears poised to reclaim influence. Eastern Europeans are optimistic that Merz will advocate for a firmer stance on Ukraine, while Brussels hopes his leadership will restore Germany’s authority in the EU.
The desire for leadership in Europe is palpable, particularly as France’s President Emmanuel Macron appears directionless until the 2027 election and Britain finds itself outside the EU influence. The most stable governments exist in Poland and Italy, though they remain peripheral.
Berlin will be in a waiting game for leadership, likely until after Trump has taken office, as German elections will not occur before then.
**In Warsaw: Fear of Putin, Receptiveness for Trump**
Traveling from Berlin to Warsaw, one senses a dynamic shift, akin to moving “West.”
The vibrancy that seems lost in Berlin thrives in Warsaw. The city boasts a lively youth culture, entrepreneurial spirit, and an entrepreneurial environment. Politically, however, there's a mixed sense of stability and urgency.
Warsaw, once infamous for its grim Communist past, now features 278 vegan restaurants—a noteworthy culinary indicator. Since 1990, Poland’s economy has expanded tenfold, signifying a significant transformation among its populace. Recent generations display confidence and modernity, transitioning from rural and Catholic roots to a more forward-looking identity.
This evolution doesn’t solely underscore Poland’s significance in the Trump era; it occupies a strategic position on Europe’s frontline with Russia. As a leading military spender in terms of GDP per capita, Poland is keen for Europe and America to confront Putin. This counters criticisms that Europeans neglect their defense responsibilities.
Given the vulnerability of Western Europe, Poland stands out among Eastern European nations that Trump favors, sharing mutual appreciation for each other. Countries like Finland and the Baltic states resonate similarly with apprehension toward Russia, informed by historical conflicts.
Next year, Poland has a unique opportunity to shape the Continent's trajectory, especially since other key players like Paris and Berlin appear less poised for significant action. Warsaw boasts experienced leaders: Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. The city will hold the rotating presidency of the EU, providing it with meaningful influence. Trump’s most favorable visit during his first term was to Warsaw in 2017, paving the way for goodwill.
Poland recognizes its potential but harbors doubts about its current state. “We’re still one of the poorer countries in Europe — seventh from the bottom in per capita terms — and sometimes think like one,” remarked Andrzej Olechowski, a former Polish finance and foreign minister.
Pawel Kowal, a Polish parliamentarian and envoy for Ukraine, voiced hesitations as well: “It’s hard for mid-sized countries like Poland to play the key role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis.”
Poland's political landscape remains somewhat insular and divisive. Tusk shocked many by regaining his position and unseating the populist Law and Justice party. Next spring, voters will select a new president, whose limited authority could create anxiety about Tusk's legacy if his preferred candidate falls short against Law and Justice.
In Warsaw, maximizing the political landscape to align with its vibrant societal evolution remains a challenge. The focus should be on leveraging Poland’s current historical opportunity—securing its eastern border by supporting Ukraine and countering Putin’s aggression. The existential stakes are akin to those expressed in the national anthems of both nations, which begin with the refrain that their countries “aren’t dead — yet.”
Olivia Brown for TROIB News
Europe is not a monolith; it comprises diverse attitudes and strategies regarding itself and its crucial political, military, and economic partner, the United States. Many nations are increasingly concerned about the prospect of a president who has expressed ambivalence toward traditional alliances, suggested the possibility of shuttering NATO, and threatened trade wars.
To gauge the type of Europe that will welcome Trump next year, I embarked on a post-election journey through three significant capitals: Brussels, the EU’s administrative center; Berlin; and Warsaw, which serves as a frontline outpost bordered by Russia and Ukraine.
In Berlin, much like my observations in Paris earlier in the autumn, I encountered a Europe grappling with its own domestic challenges, seemingly unable to rise to the occasion in the near future. However, both Warsaw and Brussels fostered a serious dialogue regarding the implications of U.S. changes for the European bloc, indicating an understanding of their limitations amid the larger global landscape.
**In Brussels: A Union at the Crossroads**
Belgians, known for their unique sense of humor, demonstrate this on the Rue de la Loi — a street connecting the city’s EU quarter to the royal palace. In front of a long-abandoned plot where a hotel once stood, a faded mural once proclaimed, “The Future Is Europe.” Yet, the future feels uncertain and, perhaps, stagnant. Days after my visit, that mural was removed to facilitate the construction of a new office building. Arriving from Washington, I anticipated that Trump’s election would exacerbate the existing anxiety in Europe. While I found the unease palpable, especially regarding the general malaise, there was also a newfound sense of realism and urgency among senior EU and NATO officials in Brussels.
Trump’s possible return represents a pivotal moment in the long history of transatlantic relations. Fabrice Pothier, the former head of policy planning at NATO, describes one possible future as “the great undocking,” suggesting a widening separation between Europe and America. European ambivalence toward U.S. cultural and national fervors may deepen, alongside an isolationism that raises doubts about America’s commitment to European defense, while protectionism could disrupt vital commercial ties. Conversely, the U.S. may become increasingly disinterested in a Europe perceived as stagnant and lacking innovation.
Historically, even at our lowest points, such as during the Iraq war in 2003, a “great undocking” had never occurred since World War II. In Europe, there remains a strong desire among the political fringes to avert this scenario, including among the traditionally “anti-American” French. However, the relationship must evolve; Europe must adapt as well. If done correctly, this evolution will clarify for America why it’s beneficial to maintain ties with Europe.
There are indicators that this evolution could come to fruition. The leading figures in Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Rutte, adopt a practical approach to the new Trump era. Von der Leyen, who heads the European Commission, eschews the preachiness of past leaders and presents a businesslike demeanor. Rutte, NATO’s new chief, brings fresh energy to the organization and appears to maintain a decent rapport with Trump.
Immediate challenges await. On the Ukraine conflict, Trump’s impending presidency has already fostered a consensus among European and Ukrainian leaders to pursue a resolution in early 2025. The worst-case scenario could involve a Trump peace plan mirroring Vladimir Putin’s proposals, failing to secure a sovereign Ukraine or NATO’s potential involvement. A better scenario would establish a demilitarized zone, leave unresolved questions regarding Ukrainian territories, and provide a protective umbrella for Kyiv, with NATO’s future support and troop presence.
“Biden was so frustrating,” lamented a senior NATO official. “I believe Trump can be better. It cannot go on like this.”
Such frustrations had rarely been expressed before the election. Publicly, Ukrainians and NATO Europeans were grateful to President Joe Biden for rallying support and supplying arms. Nonetheless, there was dissatisfaction regarding Washington’s commitment to securing a Ukrainian victory. The reluctance to firmly support arms shipments condemned Ukraine to a protracted conflict, offering Putin the perception that time favored him.
The future of NATO appears particularly tenuous. Trump has threatened to withdraw from the alliance or undermine it by disregarding the Article 5 commitment to defend allies against attack. However, there seems to be less existential dread at NATO now than there was in 2017, when Trump made such threats. Former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg seemingly convinced Trump of NATO’s “usefulness.” Legislation proposed by Sen. Marco Rubio, who is likely to be the next Secretary of State, seeks to prevent any president from exiting NATO without Senate approval.
“Actually my greatest worry is an ineffective administration in Washington,” said another senior NATO official. “That they go this way or that. The Democrats were like that — they couldn’t make a decision.”
“The immediate concern is what kind of deal they force the Ukrainians to make,” this official added.
An ambitious but feasible approach would involve enhancing military and political support for Ukraine to deter Putin, leading France and Britain—both nuclear powers—to discuss extending security guarantees under any peace agreement. They are cautious about ensuring U.S. backing under Trump’s leadership, recalling memories of the Suez crisis when America effectively abandoned them.
On trade, the anxieties in Brussels are palpable. As the EU’s largest trading partner with the U.S., any aggressive moves by the Trump administration, particularly against China, would impact Europe as they restructure supply chains.
Individuals in positions of power share experiences from Trump’s first term, with some echoing his sentiments. An incoming European Commissioner even outlined a potential deal: The EU could purchase U.S. military equipment and liquefied natural gas in exchange for trade concessions. “We need to think, what goodies do we offer the U.S.?” this official remarked. There’s an evident effort within Brussels to internalize aspects of Trumpism, even without full familiarity with his writings.
“It is in neither European nor American interests to ‘undock,’” stated a second senior NATO official.
To maintain a robust transatlantic relationship, a strong case must be articulated in Trumpian terms. The U.S. military relies on European bases and allies to exert influence in the Middle East and Asia, while American defense manufacturers value the European market, anticipating the deployment of over 600 F-35s by European forces by the decade’s end.
Europe, too, must awaken from its complacency. The post-Cold War period saw a shift in resources from defense to welfare, with the expectation that the U.S. would shoulder their security responsibilities. Europe is undeniably aware of its historical context, from the battlefields of Flanders Fields to the rise of fascism during World War II.
The era of complacency is over. The Ukraine conflict should underscore this reality, especially for Eastern Europe, which has strengthened its militaries and cultivated more competitive economies. The Western part of the continent, however, remains largely in denial, a situation that will become increasingly difficult under Trump’s watch.
**In Berlin: A Crisis of Leadership**
A pressing question for a continent adrift is whether Europe has the leadership necessary to establish a renewed transatlantic relationship with Trump and regain its global standing.
Berlin, a focal point for this inquiry, simultaneously represents both hope and hindrance. Following Trump’s election, Germany’s traffic light coalition fractured, failing to deliver on the promise of a renewed commitment to defense and diplomatic leadership that Chancellor Olaf Scholz touted following the onset of the Ukraine war.
Initially energizing, this dynamic succumbed to bureaucratic inertia and political timidity. Scholz positioned himself as a leader of the status quo, advocating for Ukraine without provoking Russia. In the German context, the notion of “Putinversteher”—the need to understand and empathize with Putin—gained traction once more.
Internationally, Scholz has been perceived as indecisive and ineffective, especially as Europe seeks assertive leadership regarding Ukraine. Many diplomats candidly described his tenure as "a disaster," "hopeless," and "terrible."
Scholz faces significant challenges domestically as well. Germany’s export-driven economic model is faltering amid rising energy costs and heightened competition from China. An aging population compounded by a lack of technological innovation is contributing to a recessionary mindset.
Berlin, now reflective of this grim national mood, stands in stark contrast to its pre-pandemic vibrancy. The city once buzzed with creativity and cultural energy akin to New York. My recent visits revealed a progressively darker atmosphere, with Scholz embodying the stasis.
Germany's “left behind” population, especially in the poorer east, is shifting toward far-right sentiments.
This narrative sounds familiar; Germany grappled with similar challenges two decades ago when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implemented unpopular reform measures that ultimately led to a revival.
The phrase “Waiting for Merz” echoes through discussions in Berlin, Warsaw, and Brussels, referring to Friedrich Merz, leader of the center-right Christian Democrats. After losing a power struggle to Angela Merkel decades ago, he now appears poised to reclaim influence. Eastern Europeans are optimistic that Merz will advocate for a firmer stance on Ukraine, while Brussels hopes his leadership will restore Germany’s authority in the EU.
The desire for leadership in Europe is palpable, particularly as France’s President Emmanuel Macron appears directionless until the 2027 election and Britain finds itself outside the EU influence. The most stable governments exist in Poland and Italy, though they remain peripheral.
Berlin will be in a waiting game for leadership, likely until after Trump has taken office, as German elections will not occur before then.
**In Warsaw: Fear of Putin, Receptiveness for Trump**
Traveling from Berlin to Warsaw, one senses a dynamic shift, akin to moving “West.”
The vibrancy that seems lost in Berlin thrives in Warsaw. The city boasts a lively youth culture, entrepreneurial spirit, and an entrepreneurial environment. Politically, however, there's a mixed sense of stability and urgency.
Warsaw, once infamous for its grim Communist past, now features 278 vegan restaurants—a noteworthy culinary indicator. Since 1990, Poland’s economy has expanded tenfold, signifying a significant transformation among its populace. Recent generations display confidence and modernity, transitioning from rural and Catholic roots to a more forward-looking identity.
This evolution doesn’t solely underscore Poland’s significance in the Trump era; it occupies a strategic position on Europe’s frontline with Russia. As a leading military spender in terms of GDP per capita, Poland is keen for Europe and America to confront Putin. This counters criticisms that Europeans neglect their defense responsibilities.
Given the vulnerability of Western Europe, Poland stands out among Eastern European nations that Trump favors, sharing mutual appreciation for each other. Countries like Finland and the Baltic states resonate similarly with apprehension toward Russia, informed by historical conflicts.
Next year, Poland has a unique opportunity to shape the Continent's trajectory, especially since other key players like Paris and Berlin appear less poised for significant action. Warsaw boasts experienced leaders: Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. The city will hold the rotating presidency of the EU, providing it with meaningful influence. Trump’s most favorable visit during his first term was to Warsaw in 2017, paving the way for goodwill.
Poland recognizes its potential but harbors doubts about its current state. “We’re still one of the poorer countries in Europe — seventh from the bottom in per capita terms — and sometimes think like one,” remarked Andrzej Olechowski, a former Polish finance and foreign minister.
Pawel Kowal, a Polish parliamentarian and envoy for Ukraine, voiced hesitations as well: “It’s hard for mid-sized countries like Poland to play the key role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis.”
Poland's political landscape remains somewhat insular and divisive. Tusk shocked many by regaining his position and unseating the populist Law and Justice party. Next spring, voters will select a new president, whose limited authority could create anxiety about Tusk's legacy if his preferred candidate falls short against Law and Justice.
In Warsaw, maximizing the political landscape to align with its vibrant societal evolution remains a challenge. The focus should be on leveraging Poland’s current historical opportunity—securing its eastern border by supporting Ukraine and countering Putin’s aggression. The existential stakes are akin to those expressed in the national anthems of both nations, which begin with the refrain that their countries “aren’t dead — yet.”
Olivia Brown for TROIB News
