Congress May Have Inadvertently Benefited Trump in Attempt to "Trump-Proof" the Transition
Limited access to government office space, email addresses, and cybersecurity resources could render a potential Trump transition team more susceptible to hacking or foreign surveillance.
TroibNews 
Donald Trump cannot legally postpone the next presidential transition as he did in 2020. However, Congress’ efforts to safeguard the peaceful transfer of power from disruptions reminiscent of Trump's may, unintentionally, have introduced new complications.
In 2020, Trump’s refusal to concede delayed President Joe Biden’s transition team from accessing federal funds and vital information for several weeks. This obstruction significantly hampered the new administration's readiness regarding national security and its management of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.
To avoid a similar situation, Congress enacted a law in 2022 that permits several leading presidential candidates to access transition resources before a winner is finalized in a contested election.
While this rule change aimed to address one of the many issues that affected the last transition, it may allow Trump to tap into federal resources and state secrets needed to initiate government formation without complying with rules regarding fundraising, conflicts of interest, and transparency—should he lose the election.
Recent weeks have seen rising concerns, particularly as the Trump transition committee considers an unusual option: opting out of federal government assistance and the associated ethics regulations. Even organizations dedicated to transparency that supported this change express worry that the country could enter “uncharted territory” should Trump fail to sign essential coordination agreements with the Biden administration.
“A plain reading of the law suggests that it will be hard for [the General Services Administration] or the other transition service providers to offer support to the Trump team without their abiding by the law,” stated Max Stier, the CEO of the nonpartisan nonprofit Partnership for Public Service, which aids all parties in transition planning. Nonetheless, he surmised, “the Biden team would likely feel a deep sense of responsibility to help a potential Trump-elect with essential transition planning and they would undoubtedly do all that they could, legally, to provide support.”
The potential pitfalls of this scenario are clear: Without a memorandum of understanding outlining transition rules, corporations or interest groups could contribute unlimited sums to Trump's transition without him disclosing the funding sources. Furthermore, choosing to forgo federal office space, email addresses, and cybersecurity resources could leave a potential Trump transition team more susceptible to hacking or foreign surveillance.
The Trump transition team declined to comment on its plans but issued a statement to PMG last week indicating that its lawyers “continue to constructively engage” with the Biden administration “regarding all agreements contemplated by the Presidential Transition Act.”
Despite these apprehensions, many lawmakers and analysts assert that the 2022 amendment to the Presidential Transition Act has a net-positive effect on democracy. It would be unjust and perilous, they contend, to burden the political appointee serving as GSA administrator—whose primary role involves managing the federal government's extensive real estate—with the task of declaring the election's victor and distributing transition resources.
Previously, the GSA head was in charge of “ascertaining” a single presidential election winner solely to kick off the transition process, yet there were no defined guidelines for making that determination. Although the agency operates with nominal independence in this decision, the prior rules left room for presidential influence.
“GSA administrators are political appointees, so it's a very difficult position to put someone in,” Stier noted, referring to the intense pressure faced by then-GSA Administrator Emily Murphy during 2020 when she “served at the pleasure of an incumbent president who was arguing publicly that he had won.”
Murphy had cautioned that there were “no procedures or standards for this process” when she ultimately decided that Biden could access federal resources intended for the president-elect's team—over three weeks after the 2020 election. In announcing that decision publicly, she urged Congress “to consider amendments” to the Presidential Transition Act that would provide guidance for the agency in situations involving contested elections.
“I do not think that an agency charged with improving federal procurement and property management should place itself above the constitutionally-based election process,” Murphy remarked. Her involvement in the 2020 election dispute resulted in her receiving a barrage of “threats online, by phone, and by mail directed at my safety, my family, my staff, and even my pets in an effort to coerce me into making this determination prematurely.”
In response, Congress incorporated the “Presidential Transition Improvement Act” into its 2022 year-end spending bill. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, one of the bill's sponsors, expressed being “alarmed and concerned” by the events of the 2020 transition and assisted in drafting the legislation “to ensure this doesn’t happen again.”
Consequently, explained Michael Thorning, the director of the structural democracy project at the Bipartisan Policy Center, there remains the possibility of a post-election period where courts and state entities determine the lawful winner. However, thanks to the updated law, a backlog of election disputes is unlikely to cause the federal government to enter the kind of deadlock that occurred in 2020.
“Both candidates would continue to plan as if they were transitioning into the administration until that's resolved, rather than pressing pause on the transition,” he elaborated.
Still, some observers interpret the uncertainty created by the Trump transition team’s hesitance to sign agreements with GSA and the White House as indicative of the limitations of the new law.
“The Trump transition might be playing a game of chicken with the Biden White House,” cautioned Heath Brown, an associate professor of public policy at CUNY’s John Jay College. He suggested this strategy acknowledges that the government would likely need to grant access to crucial information and resources, regardless of whether they sign the agreement, to avoid catastrophic consequences if Trump were to win.
A GSA spokesperson confirmed the agency has “entered into an MOU with the Harris transition team outlining the terms for space and services” and is “actively working with the Trump transition team to complete an MOU.” Additionally, White House spokesperson Saloni Sharma indicated that they are also “actively working with the Trump transition team to complete a MOU” following an agreement with Vice President Kamala Harris’ team. Harris’ transition team did not respond to requests for comment.
Stier acknowledges that the new rules could impose additional burdens on career civil servants and may necessitate the release of confidential information to individuals who may not assume office. Nonetheless, the head of the Partnership for Public Service maintains that the risks associated with the previous system were even more significant.
“Anything that actually disrupts the ability of the incoming president to have all the preparation necessary to be a successful leader is something that strikes fear in our hearts,” he asserted. “Our world is more dangerous, more fast-moving, and more complicated than it was in 2000 or 2020.”
Yet Brown, who authored a book on the 2020 transition, warns that vulnerabilities to the process persist even if Trump's team ultimately signs federal agreements to establish guardrails.
Despite the GSA recognizing Biden as the victor, he noted, officials from the Trump administration engaged in obstructive actions that had tangible impacts. Delays from the Office of Management and Budget hindered the development of Biden’s initial budget, and intelligence and defense officials withheld “non-public intelligence threats to the country.” Drawing parallels with findings from the 9/11 Commission—which determined that the prolonged delay in the 2000 transition played a role in the Bush administration’s lack of preparedness for the subsequent terrorist attacks—Brown voiced concerns that the Biden team was apprehensive about facing a similar challenge.
These types of obstructions, he cautioned, could very well be repeated.
“It's very, very difficult—nearly impossible—for Congress to legislate cooperation, and that means that many of the risks that we face in 2020 are still with us today,” he concluded.
Thomas Evans for TROIB News
In 2020, Trump’s refusal to concede delayed President Joe Biden’s transition team from accessing federal funds and vital information for several weeks. This obstruction significantly hampered the new administration's readiness regarding national security and its management of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.
To avoid a similar situation, Congress enacted a law in 2022 that permits several leading presidential candidates to access transition resources before a winner is finalized in a contested election.
While this rule change aimed to address one of the many issues that affected the last transition, it may allow Trump to tap into federal resources and state secrets needed to initiate government formation without complying with rules regarding fundraising, conflicts of interest, and transparency—should he lose the election.
Recent weeks have seen rising concerns, particularly as the Trump transition committee considers an unusual option: opting out of federal government assistance and the associated ethics regulations. Even organizations dedicated to transparency that supported this change express worry that the country could enter “uncharted territory” should Trump fail to sign essential coordination agreements with the Biden administration.
“A plain reading of the law suggests that it will be hard for [the General Services Administration] or the other transition service providers to offer support to the Trump team without their abiding by the law,” stated Max Stier, the CEO of the nonpartisan nonprofit Partnership for Public Service, which aids all parties in transition planning. Nonetheless, he surmised, “the Biden team would likely feel a deep sense of responsibility to help a potential Trump-elect with essential transition planning and they would undoubtedly do all that they could, legally, to provide support.”
The potential pitfalls of this scenario are clear: Without a memorandum of understanding outlining transition rules, corporations or interest groups could contribute unlimited sums to Trump's transition without him disclosing the funding sources. Furthermore, choosing to forgo federal office space, email addresses, and cybersecurity resources could leave a potential Trump transition team more susceptible to hacking or foreign surveillance.
The Trump transition team declined to comment on its plans but issued a statement to PMG last week indicating that its lawyers “continue to constructively engage” with the Biden administration “regarding all agreements contemplated by the Presidential Transition Act.”
Despite these apprehensions, many lawmakers and analysts assert that the 2022 amendment to the Presidential Transition Act has a net-positive effect on democracy. It would be unjust and perilous, they contend, to burden the political appointee serving as GSA administrator—whose primary role involves managing the federal government's extensive real estate—with the task of declaring the election's victor and distributing transition resources.
Previously, the GSA head was in charge of “ascertaining” a single presidential election winner solely to kick off the transition process, yet there were no defined guidelines for making that determination. Although the agency operates with nominal independence in this decision, the prior rules left room for presidential influence.
“GSA administrators are political appointees, so it's a very difficult position to put someone in,” Stier noted, referring to the intense pressure faced by then-GSA Administrator Emily Murphy during 2020 when she “served at the pleasure of an incumbent president who was arguing publicly that he had won.”
Murphy had cautioned that there were “no procedures or standards for this process” when she ultimately decided that Biden could access federal resources intended for the president-elect's team—over three weeks after the 2020 election. In announcing that decision publicly, she urged Congress “to consider amendments” to the Presidential Transition Act that would provide guidance for the agency in situations involving contested elections.
“I do not think that an agency charged with improving federal procurement and property management should place itself above the constitutionally-based election process,” Murphy remarked. Her involvement in the 2020 election dispute resulted in her receiving a barrage of “threats online, by phone, and by mail directed at my safety, my family, my staff, and even my pets in an effort to coerce me into making this determination prematurely.”
In response, Congress incorporated the “Presidential Transition Improvement Act” into its 2022 year-end spending bill. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, one of the bill's sponsors, expressed being “alarmed and concerned” by the events of the 2020 transition and assisted in drafting the legislation “to ensure this doesn’t happen again.”
Consequently, explained Michael Thorning, the director of the structural democracy project at the Bipartisan Policy Center, there remains the possibility of a post-election period where courts and state entities determine the lawful winner. However, thanks to the updated law, a backlog of election disputes is unlikely to cause the federal government to enter the kind of deadlock that occurred in 2020.
“Both candidates would continue to plan as if they were transitioning into the administration until that's resolved, rather than pressing pause on the transition,” he elaborated.
Still, some observers interpret the uncertainty created by the Trump transition team’s hesitance to sign agreements with GSA and the White House as indicative of the limitations of the new law.
“The Trump transition might be playing a game of chicken with the Biden White House,” cautioned Heath Brown, an associate professor of public policy at CUNY’s John Jay College. He suggested this strategy acknowledges that the government would likely need to grant access to crucial information and resources, regardless of whether they sign the agreement, to avoid catastrophic consequences if Trump were to win.
A GSA spokesperson confirmed the agency has “entered into an MOU with the Harris transition team outlining the terms for space and services” and is “actively working with the Trump transition team to complete an MOU.” Additionally, White House spokesperson Saloni Sharma indicated that they are also “actively working with the Trump transition team to complete a MOU” following an agreement with Vice President Kamala Harris’ team. Harris’ transition team did not respond to requests for comment.
Stier acknowledges that the new rules could impose additional burdens on career civil servants and may necessitate the release of confidential information to individuals who may not assume office. Nonetheless, the head of the Partnership for Public Service maintains that the risks associated with the previous system were even more significant.
“Anything that actually disrupts the ability of the incoming president to have all the preparation necessary to be a successful leader is something that strikes fear in our hearts,” he asserted. “Our world is more dangerous, more fast-moving, and more complicated than it was in 2000 or 2020.”
Yet Brown, who authored a book on the 2020 transition, warns that vulnerabilities to the process persist even if Trump's team ultimately signs federal agreements to establish guardrails.
Despite the GSA recognizing Biden as the victor, he noted, officials from the Trump administration engaged in obstructive actions that had tangible impacts. Delays from the Office of Management and Budget hindered the development of Biden’s initial budget, and intelligence and defense officials withheld “non-public intelligence threats to the country.” Drawing parallels with findings from the 9/11 Commission—which determined that the prolonged delay in the 2000 transition played a role in the Bush administration’s lack of preparedness for the subsequent terrorist attacks—Brown voiced concerns that the Biden team was apprehensive about facing a similar challenge.
These types of obstructions, he cautioned, could very well be repeated.
“It's very, very difficult—nearly impossible—for Congress to legislate cooperation, and that means that many of the risks that we face in 2020 are still with us today,” he concluded.
Thomas Evans for TROIB News
