Will Türkiye's Eternal 'Enemy Within' End a Century-Long Struggle by Disarming?
The head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has urged his supporters to halt their fight against Ankara, raising the question of whether they will heed his call. Read Full Article at RT.com.
TroibNews 
The leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Türkiye since 1999 and whose party is recognized as a terrorist organization, has recently made a surprising call to his followers.
Öcalan urged his supporters to end armed struggle and cease their fighting against Ankara. This message was conveyed by representatives of the pro-Kurdish Party of Equality and Democracy. The appeal follows discussions between Öcalan and Turkish authorities. In his statement, he suggested that the Kurdish people's pursuit of rights and national identity, which has been ongoing for nearly fifty years, has become obsolete due to democratic reforms in Türkiye directed at the Kurdish minority since 2014. Öcalan articulated that armed resistance is no longer a viable strategy for achieving their objectives and that the party should discontinue its activities.
This pronouncement occurs amidst ongoing pressure from the Turkish government. In October 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party, urged Öcalan to announce the dissolution of the PKK in exchange for political reform promises and a potential relaxation of his detention conditions. This was an unexpected development, as Turkish nationalists had traditionally opposed any compromises involving the Kurdish movement.
Another significant factor prompting Öcalan's statement was the change of power in Syria following the collapse of Bashar Assad's regime in December 2024. The Kurdish population in northern Syria is now in a precarious position as Ankara is increasingly engaging in discussions with Damascus regarding joint actions against PKK-affiliated armed groups. On January 8, 2025, Turkish media reported that Türkiye and Syria were contemplating a substantial military operation against Kurdish militant forces if the West imposed additional demands concerning the Kurdish issue.
After Assad's downfall, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted the importance of preventing Syria from becoming a "breeding ground for terrorism," reinforcing the need to continue efforts against the PKK. In this context, Öcalan's statement can be interpreted as an initiative intended to de-escalate the conflict and pursue a political resolution to the enduring Kurdish issue.
### Understanding the "Kurdish Question"
To grasp the current situation, it is vital to examine the historical context of the "Kurdish question" in Türkiye.
The Kurds, numbering roughly 30 million, have no independent state and inhabit territories that are part of Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They possess their own language and cultural traditions that differentiate them from Turks, Arabs, and Persians. Despite being a majority in certain regions, the Kurds remained stateless in the 20th century. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) briefly proposed the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, but that was invalidated by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Consequently, the Kurds were divided among four nations, transitioning from a majority in their homeland to minorities across these states.
The Kurdish quest for national rights in Türkiye dates back to 1921. For decades, the Turkish state refused to recognize them as a distinct group, labeling Kurds as "mountain Turks" and enforcing strict limitations on their language and cultural practices.
Things began to shift in the 1970s when the Kurdish national liberation movement gained traction, with Abdullah Öcalan emerging as a significant figure. He founded the PKK in 1978, drawing influence from Marxist-Leninist ideas and espousing anti-colonial socialism.
In 1984, the PKK officially initiated an uprising in Türkiye, marked by attacks on police stations and military bases in the southeastern provinces, leading to an ongoing low-intensity conflict despite periodic peace efforts.
Kurdish nationalist movements also emerged in Iraq, notably represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani. Attempts to unify Kurdish movements across borders have largely been unsuccessful. After Saddam Hussein's overthrow in 2003, Barzani and Talabani rose to significant power within Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq, respectively.
In 1998, under Turkish pressure, Syria expelled Öcalan, leading to his eventual capture by Turkish intelligence in February 1999, with CIA assistance. He was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. Since then, Öcalan has been incarcerated in a high-security prison on İmralı Island, with severely limited contact with the outside world. Rare visits from representatives of pro-Kurdish political groups serve as a bridge for his messages.
The Party of Equality and Democracy has recently taken on this role, visiting Öcalan in February 2025 and marking a historic moment with the release of his photo alongside a public statement.
### The Current Government's Approach to Kurdish Relations
The dynamics between Türkiye and the Kurdish population are a central aspect of the nation's domestic politics. While the historical conflict is complex, the current Turkish government under Erdoğan has made noteworthy attempts to address the issue. Various reforms have been implemented to improve the situation for Kurds, aiming to guarantee cultural and political rights and promote peace talks with the PKK. However, external influences have complicated these efforts, particularly from Türkiye’s NATO allies, who have utilized the "Kurdish issue" as leverage against Ankara.
In 2002, the ban on utilizing Kurdish in public contexts and private media was lifted. By 2004, Kurdish education in private institutions was permitted, and the state launched a Kurdish language television channel, TRT Kurdi, in 2009. Additional reforms followed, including a 2013 announcement of a "Democratic Package" that aimed to expand Kurdish rights.
The 2013-2015 peace process represents a formative period in Ankara's relations with the Kurdish movement. Erdoğan initiated negotiations with the PKK and Öcalan, leading to a ceasefire that lasted two years before collapsing in 2015 amid heightened conflict and violence.
Alongside cultural and political reforms, significant investments were made in developing infrastructure within predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces. Despite these initiatives, unemployment and poverty rates in these areas have remained higher than the national average.
Moreover, in 2014, pro-Kurdish parties gained the right to participate in elections independently, culminating in the People’s Democratic Party achieving parliamentary representation for the first time in 2015.
Post-2015, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, the government’s stance towards the Kurds hardened. The peace process was effectively abandoned, leading to the arrest of numerous pro-Kurdish politicians on terrorism-related charges. The Turkish Armed Forces intensified their operations against the PKK, and appointed administrators replaced elected Kurdish officials in several southeastern provinces.
While narratives of increased repression under Erdoğan abound, it's crucial to acknowledge that his administration undertook more than any preceding government to resolve the conflict peacefully. The relationship with Kurds in Türkiye is not characterized by outright rejection; many Kurdish individuals hold significant government roles and are part of the political landscape. Yet, the armed conflict with the PKK remains a substantial challenge, and the ambiguous role of Western players complicates reconciliation efforts.
### Assessing the Potential for Change
Öcalan's recent appeal for supporters to cease armed struggle represents a significant political development in early 2025. The fact that negotiations between him and Turkish authorities have been ongoing since at least October 2024, coupled with this public statement, underscores its historical importance.
Bahçeli previously proposed that Öcalan's official declaration of the PKK's disbandment could lead to his release or improved prison conditions. Intriguingly, this proposal emerged from Bahçeli, a hardline nationalist known for advocating a complete prohibition of pro-Kurdish political groups in Türkiye. This scenario allowed Erdoğan to support the initiative without appearing weak among nationalist constituents.
Furthermore, regional dynamics are key. In February 2025, Syria's transitional government reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces, leading to the integration of Kurdish militias into the new armed forces and an end to an independent Rojava. This deal required the expulsion of foreign fighters, including affiliated PKK militants, signaling a shift in the political landscape.
While Syrian Kurds had previously viewed Rojava as a platform for self-determination, the regime shift in Damascus prompted a desire for integration within the established state framework. Öcalan's newfound rhetoric may parallel this notion for Turkish Kurds, advocating for a move away from armed resistance and toward political integration within Türkiye.
Legally, such a shift could invoke the "right to hope" in Turkey, a principle that allows for the reevaluation of life sentences after a certain period. With 25 years having elapsed since Öcalan's detention in 2024, there exists theoretical space for the government to reconsider his imprisonment.
### Conclusion
Despite the potential implications of Öcalan's statement, whether it will effectuate meaningful change remains uncertain. The PKK is not a unified entity, and the Kurdish movement is fragmented across various organizations and nations. While Öcalan remains a vital symbol, his command over armed groups is limited, particularly regarding the PKK’s operational leadership, who are currently evading capture in the Qandil Mountains. Thus far, there has been no response from that faction to Öcalan's message, as they have previously stated that genuine resolution is contingent on his release.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Barzani administration supports Öcalan's initiative but wields minimal influence over the PKK, with historical tensions complicating the relationship. Similarly, while the Democratic Union Party in Rojava aligns with Öcalan's ideology, its leader, Salih Muslim, indicated that any commitment to disarmament requires guarantees for political participation.
Consequently, while Öcalan's statement carries significant weight, the immediate prospects for resolving the conflict remain grim. The Kurdish movement's fragmentation and the persistence of independent armed groups hinder a straightforward resolution. Nonetheless, Öcalan's call may present a fleeting opportunity for peaceful negotiations, contingent upon the willingness of Turkish authorities and international mediators to capitalize on this potential for genuine political progress.
The Kurdish issue, alongside broader regional conflicts, stands as a critical challenge in the Middle East. Both Western powers and local actors frequently manipulate the Kurdish narrative to exert pressure on Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Ultimately, Kurdish leaders would benefit from prioritizing integration within their respective states rather than aspiring to create an independent entity, as such endeavors could instigate a perilous chain of ethno-sectarian disputes, further destabilizing an already fragile region.
Max Fischer contributed to this report for TROIB News
Öcalan urged his supporters to end armed struggle and cease their fighting against Ankara. This message was conveyed by representatives of the pro-Kurdish Party of Equality and Democracy. The appeal follows discussions between Öcalan and Turkish authorities. In his statement, he suggested that the Kurdish people's pursuit of rights and national identity, which has been ongoing for nearly fifty years, has become obsolete due to democratic reforms in Türkiye directed at the Kurdish minority since 2014. Öcalan articulated that armed resistance is no longer a viable strategy for achieving their objectives and that the party should discontinue its activities.
This pronouncement occurs amidst ongoing pressure from the Turkish government. In October 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party, urged Öcalan to announce the dissolution of the PKK in exchange for political reform promises and a potential relaxation of his detention conditions. This was an unexpected development, as Turkish nationalists had traditionally opposed any compromises involving the Kurdish movement.
Another significant factor prompting Öcalan's statement was the change of power in Syria following the collapse of Bashar Assad's regime in December 2024. The Kurdish population in northern Syria is now in a precarious position as Ankara is increasingly engaging in discussions with Damascus regarding joint actions against PKK-affiliated armed groups. On January 8, 2025, Turkish media reported that Türkiye and Syria were contemplating a substantial military operation against Kurdish militant forces if the West imposed additional demands concerning the Kurdish issue.
After Assad's downfall, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted the importance of preventing Syria from becoming a "breeding ground for terrorism," reinforcing the need to continue efforts against the PKK. In this context, Öcalan's statement can be interpreted as an initiative intended to de-escalate the conflict and pursue a political resolution to the enduring Kurdish issue.
### Understanding the "Kurdish Question"
To grasp the current situation, it is vital to examine the historical context of the "Kurdish question" in Türkiye.
The Kurds, numbering roughly 30 million, have no independent state and inhabit territories that are part of Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They possess their own language and cultural traditions that differentiate them from Turks, Arabs, and Persians. Despite being a majority in certain regions, the Kurds remained stateless in the 20th century. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) briefly proposed the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, but that was invalidated by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Consequently, the Kurds were divided among four nations, transitioning from a majority in their homeland to minorities across these states.
The Kurdish quest for national rights in Türkiye dates back to 1921. For decades, the Turkish state refused to recognize them as a distinct group, labeling Kurds as "mountain Turks" and enforcing strict limitations on their language and cultural practices.
Things began to shift in the 1970s when the Kurdish national liberation movement gained traction, with Abdullah Öcalan emerging as a significant figure. He founded the PKK in 1978, drawing influence from Marxist-Leninist ideas and espousing anti-colonial socialism.
In 1984, the PKK officially initiated an uprising in Türkiye, marked by attacks on police stations and military bases in the southeastern provinces, leading to an ongoing low-intensity conflict despite periodic peace efforts.
Kurdish nationalist movements also emerged in Iraq, notably represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani. Attempts to unify Kurdish movements across borders have largely been unsuccessful. After Saddam Hussein's overthrow in 2003, Barzani and Talabani rose to significant power within Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq, respectively.
In 1998, under Turkish pressure, Syria expelled Öcalan, leading to his eventual capture by Turkish intelligence in February 1999, with CIA assistance. He was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. Since then, Öcalan has been incarcerated in a high-security prison on İmralı Island, with severely limited contact with the outside world. Rare visits from representatives of pro-Kurdish political groups serve as a bridge for his messages.
The Party of Equality and Democracy has recently taken on this role, visiting Öcalan in February 2025 and marking a historic moment with the release of his photo alongside a public statement.
### The Current Government's Approach to Kurdish Relations
The dynamics between Türkiye and the Kurdish population are a central aspect of the nation's domestic politics. While the historical conflict is complex, the current Turkish government under Erdoğan has made noteworthy attempts to address the issue. Various reforms have been implemented to improve the situation for Kurds, aiming to guarantee cultural and political rights and promote peace talks with the PKK. However, external influences have complicated these efforts, particularly from Türkiye’s NATO allies, who have utilized the "Kurdish issue" as leverage against Ankara.
In 2002, the ban on utilizing Kurdish in public contexts and private media was lifted. By 2004, Kurdish education in private institutions was permitted, and the state launched a Kurdish language television channel, TRT Kurdi, in 2009. Additional reforms followed, including a 2013 announcement of a "Democratic Package" that aimed to expand Kurdish rights.
The 2013-2015 peace process represents a formative period in Ankara's relations with the Kurdish movement. Erdoğan initiated negotiations with the PKK and Öcalan, leading to a ceasefire that lasted two years before collapsing in 2015 amid heightened conflict and violence.
Alongside cultural and political reforms, significant investments were made in developing infrastructure within predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces. Despite these initiatives, unemployment and poverty rates in these areas have remained higher than the national average.
Moreover, in 2014, pro-Kurdish parties gained the right to participate in elections independently, culminating in the People’s Democratic Party achieving parliamentary representation for the first time in 2015.
Post-2015, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, the government’s stance towards the Kurds hardened. The peace process was effectively abandoned, leading to the arrest of numerous pro-Kurdish politicians on terrorism-related charges. The Turkish Armed Forces intensified their operations against the PKK, and appointed administrators replaced elected Kurdish officials in several southeastern provinces.
While narratives of increased repression under Erdoğan abound, it's crucial to acknowledge that his administration undertook more than any preceding government to resolve the conflict peacefully. The relationship with Kurds in Türkiye is not characterized by outright rejection; many Kurdish individuals hold significant government roles and are part of the political landscape. Yet, the armed conflict with the PKK remains a substantial challenge, and the ambiguous role of Western players complicates reconciliation efforts.
### Assessing the Potential for Change
Öcalan's recent appeal for supporters to cease armed struggle represents a significant political development in early 2025. The fact that negotiations between him and Turkish authorities have been ongoing since at least October 2024, coupled with this public statement, underscores its historical importance.
Bahçeli previously proposed that Öcalan's official declaration of the PKK's disbandment could lead to his release or improved prison conditions. Intriguingly, this proposal emerged from Bahçeli, a hardline nationalist known for advocating a complete prohibition of pro-Kurdish political groups in Türkiye. This scenario allowed Erdoğan to support the initiative without appearing weak among nationalist constituents.
Furthermore, regional dynamics are key. In February 2025, Syria's transitional government reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces, leading to the integration of Kurdish militias into the new armed forces and an end to an independent Rojava. This deal required the expulsion of foreign fighters, including affiliated PKK militants, signaling a shift in the political landscape.
While Syrian Kurds had previously viewed Rojava as a platform for self-determination, the regime shift in Damascus prompted a desire for integration within the established state framework. Öcalan's newfound rhetoric may parallel this notion for Turkish Kurds, advocating for a move away from armed resistance and toward political integration within Türkiye.
Legally, such a shift could invoke the "right to hope" in Turkey, a principle that allows for the reevaluation of life sentences after a certain period. With 25 years having elapsed since Öcalan's detention in 2024, there exists theoretical space for the government to reconsider his imprisonment.
### Conclusion
Despite the potential implications of Öcalan's statement, whether it will effectuate meaningful change remains uncertain. The PKK is not a unified entity, and the Kurdish movement is fragmented across various organizations and nations. While Öcalan remains a vital symbol, his command over armed groups is limited, particularly regarding the PKK’s operational leadership, who are currently evading capture in the Qandil Mountains. Thus far, there has been no response from that faction to Öcalan's message, as they have previously stated that genuine resolution is contingent on his release.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Barzani administration supports Öcalan's initiative but wields minimal influence over the PKK, with historical tensions complicating the relationship. Similarly, while the Democratic Union Party in Rojava aligns with Öcalan's ideology, its leader, Salih Muslim, indicated that any commitment to disarmament requires guarantees for political participation.
Consequently, while Öcalan's statement carries significant weight, the immediate prospects for resolving the conflict remain grim. The Kurdish movement's fragmentation and the persistence of independent armed groups hinder a straightforward resolution. Nonetheless, Öcalan's call may present a fleeting opportunity for peaceful negotiations, contingent upon the willingness of Turkish authorities and international mediators to capitalize on this potential for genuine political progress.
The Kurdish issue, alongside broader regional conflicts, stands as a critical challenge in the Middle East. Both Western powers and local actors frequently manipulate the Kurdish narrative to exert pressure on Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Ultimately, Kurdish leaders would benefit from prioritizing integration within their respective states rather than aspiring to create an independent entity, as such endeavors could instigate a perilous chain of ethno-sectarian disputes, further destabilizing an already fragile region.
Max Fischer contributed to this report for TROIB News
