Opinion | There's More on the Line for the United States in the Middle East Than You Might Realize
A CIA veteran discusses the reasons why merely eliminating the enemy and achieving victories in battles are no longer sufficient to secure overall victory in wars.
TroibNews 
### Who is Winning the Expanding Conflict between Israel, Iran, and Its Proxies?
In a passionate address to the United Nations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu firmly defended Israel's intensified campaign against Hezbollah and asserted that Israel was emerging victorious. On the flip side, the rhetoric from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas echoed similar sentiments, highlighting the toll their "resistance" efforts are extracting from Israel and its allies.
With over 34 years in the CIA’s clandestine service, my experiences in this region have involved interactions with Iranian, Hezbollah, and Palestinian agents, along with collaborations with Israeli and Arab counterparts. One of the key insights I've gained is that determining victory and defeat in the Middle East often requires a longer timeline than what is immediately perceivable. The impact of a single event can evolve over generations.
Iran's recent missile assault on Israel involved approximately 180 to 200 ballistic missiles, reportedly causing limited damage according to Israeli assessments. However, during this coinciding attack, eight Israelis were killed and at least seven others seriously injured when two Hamas gunmen opened fire in the typically serene, tree-lined streets of Jaffa. While we anticipate potential further large-scale direct confrontations between Israel and Iran, the events in Jaffa suggest that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are adapting and likely shifting towards a more “asymmetrical” strategy, as described by foreign policy analysts.
This shift means that Israel's adversaries elevate their losses as victories, venerating their martyrs or shahid. Facing traditional capabilities that may be overwhelmed, these groups often turn to guerrilla tactics akin to those used by Mao Zedong in China or Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, as well as the terrorism tactics employed by jihadist organizations, including suicide bombings and complicated attacks against vulnerable civilian targets.
Indeed, this evolution is already happening and poses increased danger to the U.S. rather than Israel. In the 1980s, Hezbollah orchestrated the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon, killed U.S. Marines, kidnapped Westerners, tortured a CIA station chief to death, and hijacked commercial flights. The 1994 attack on Argentina’s Jewish Community Center by Hezbollah killed 85, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, supported by IRGC and Hezbollah, resulted in the deaths of 19 U.S. service members. These incidents led Hezbollah and Iran to effectively drive the U.S. military presence out of Lebanon without relying on conventional arms.
Calls for Washington to launch a significant attack against Iran—either independently or in conjunction with Israel—might overlook critical lessons from the past. It’s essential to recall that the U.S. maintains numerous facilities, personnel, and assets in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and other regions of the Middle East that Israel does not, such as embassies and important military bases, along with a considerable presence of American businesses and citizens. This gives Iran and Hezbollah far more U.S. targets than Israeli ones in locations where they hold advantages and where the U.S. has limited defenses.
Terrorist groups typically maintain a low profile and have little to lose apart from their leadership and covert operatives who blend in. However, Hezbollah has evolved into a significant military and political entity, bringing with it both military and political advantages from Iranian support. This transformation has also introduced what intelligence analysts refer to as “equities”—tangible political, economic, or physical investments—creating new vulnerabilities that they did not previously have.
Now, Hezbollah stands to lose considerably more and has made it easier for adversaries, as Israel has demonstrated with its recent successful operations.
The ongoing conflict increases the likelihood that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, might consider advancing his nation’s nuclear program militarily. Such a decision could become increasingly viable for him the more Iran faces disproportionate losses from its entanglements with Israel and the U.S. While Iran might seek to keep any intentions regarding nuclear armament under wraps, U.S. and Israeli intelligence would likely uncover these plans relatively quickly, raising the question: then what?
If the U.S. adheres to its established rhetoric, echoed by Israel, stating that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is intolerable, a significant military confrontation appears inevitable. Both Iran and the U.S. could find themselves cornered politically, nullifying the chances for a graceful exit. Khamenei would be unable to backtrack without facing severe domestic backlash, while Washington would feel compelled to take military action.
Regarding the ongoing fighting, there's no need to speculate about whether the conflict will escalate into all-out war; it has already done so. We are not witnessing miscalculations that lead to unintended escalation, nor should we assume that the involved parties have a mutual interest in de-escalation. Israel is fully engaged in warfare, compelling Iran and Hezbollah to respond in kind. For Netanyahu, what may have initially been a decision influenced by the desire to mitigate potential political fallout stemming from the October 7 attacks has morphed into a much larger conflict.
Israeli officials describe the nation’s recent, unprecedented, and escalating military actions as reactive and rooted in self-defense, aimed at restoring deterrence. However, they have also acknowledged that they had been monitoring Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for some time prior to his targeted elimination. Likewise, the comprehensive assault on Hezbollah members through hacked communication devices was a strategic effort years in the making; anonymous Israeli officials indicated that they chose to trigger these devices due to growing suspicions that could expose their operation.
While there was rationale and historical precedent for Israel’s earlier restraint regarding Nasrallah—“better the devil you know”—the tipping point likely stemmed from Netanyahu’s calculation that short-term consequences could be managed. The Israeli leader opted to abandon diplomatic consideration and appeared to find expansionism toward conflict with Iran advantageous, particularly if it compelled the U.S. to join. With the U.S. elections on the horizon, Netanyahu likely felt protected against immediate ramifications from the White House. What could President Joe Biden realistically do against Netanyahu with the election looming? Any punitive actions could bolster Republican narratives of his supposed leniency towards Iran and its proxies, creating tension within the Democratic base at the potential cost of crucial votes.
Israel's aggressive warfare strategy is unlikely to eliminate or deter Iran and its proxies effectively, with future threats potentially becoming harder to preempt or resolve diplomatically. The cycle of violence in the region is often driven not by logic and pragmatism, but rather by emotion, vengeance, and the need to save face. Iran's authoritarian clerical regime relies on instilling fear and maintaining its commitment to the destruction of Israel and resistance against the U.S. for its legitimacy and survival. Groups that brand themselves as “resistance organizations” must continuously engage in opposition to remain relevant.
In this context, U.S. interests are significantly impacted by Israeli tactics. The extensive injuries and destruction among Lebanese and Palestinian populations put additional pressure on potential Arab allies to distance themselves from both Israel and the U.S., despite historical hostilities towards groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Egypt's military leadership ousted a Muslim Brotherhood administration—Hamas’s ideological parent—while Jordan expelled Hamas leaders years prior. Moreover, Gulf Arab monarchies have seen Hezbollah as a significant threat.
In light of the harrowing visuals from recent conflicts, Arab nations are unlikely to deepen ties under the Abraham Accords negotiated during the Trump administration or align publicly with Israel. Each intense confrontation, with its ramifications—collapsed buildings, rescue workers recovering victims—moves Saudi recognition of Israel further out of reach, diminishing opportunities for a broader resolution to the conflict. The significance of this lies in Saudi Arabia's pivotal role in the Arab world, given its stewardship of Islam's two holiest sites and its vast financial resources, which confer substantial influence. A Saudi deal recognizing Israel, contingent on legitimate Palestinian statehood through a “two-state” solution, could enable transformative regional change.
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman often expresses disdain for Hamas, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and sees Iranian proxies as the primary external threats to the kingdom. His attitude towards the Palestinian cause seems more pragmatic than sympathetic, adjusted since he took power in 2017. However, MBS remains open to brokering a deal with Israel, reflecting a long history of discreet security collaborations against Iran. Nevertheless, such a move could provoke a violent backlash domestically.
The regional war also bears consequences for the U.S. regarding global strategic competition. It could draw Iran and the U.S. into a major confrontation, potentially inviting the involvement of Russia and China in this proxy conflict. Furthermore, the inability of the U.S. to influence Israeli actions erodes American credibility with Arab nations, a trend that extends far beyond the immediate conflict and affects other issues including strategic competition, energy policy, economic relations, and climate change.
While Washington can't retreat from its commitment to Israel's security, it must seek to regain influence by halting the ongoing violence and escalation, making politically tough choices that involve leveraging both incentives and consequences. Achieving better outcomes might necessitate operating in the shadows. Military actions and Israel’s high-profile assassinations of Iranian officials and entities intentionally provoke Iranian responses. In contrast, covert operations, such as the Stuxnet cyberattack against Iran's nuclear program—uncovered in 2010—and targeted executions with less notoriety, often yield more substantial results without inciting large-scale violence or forcing Iran's hand into open conflict.
The right to self-defense is universally recognized as an international norm, yet excessive military responses can lead to significant bloodshed, breeding longstanding grievances and animosities. During my extensive tenure in the CIA, I observed U.S. engagement in wars across various countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. While the U.S. won most militarily, it arguably lost more conflicts than it won, with the notable exception of the first Gulf War.
Americans and Israelis must clarify what they define as security and identify long-term solutions that can be implemented reasonably and effectively. Military force and intelligence are vital components, but they require a calculated approach that acknowledges potential second-order consequences. Simply vanquishing enemies and winning battles is insufficient for winning wars in today’s complex landscape. There are alternative strategies for Israel and the U.S. to counter Hezbollah and mitigate the Iranian threat, preserving avenues for lasting solutions. However, if Netanyahu maintains his current approach and Washington remains entangled in it, the ensuing costs will impact not only Israelis but also Americans.
Rohan Mehta contributed to this report for TROIB News
In a passionate address to the United Nations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu firmly defended Israel's intensified campaign against Hezbollah and asserted that Israel was emerging victorious. On the flip side, the rhetoric from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas echoed similar sentiments, highlighting the toll their "resistance" efforts are extracting from Israel and its allies.
With over 34 years in the CIA’s clandestine service, my experiences in this region have involved interactions with Iranian, Hezbollah, and Palestinian agents, along with collaborations with Israeli and Arab counterparts. One of the key insights I've gained is that determining victory and defeat in the Middle East often requires a longer timeline than what is immediately perceivable. The impact of a single event can evolve over generations.
Iran's recent missile assault on Israel involved approximately 180 to 200 ballistic missiles, reportedly causing limited damage according to Israeli assessments. However, during this coinciding attack, eight Israelis were killed and at least seven others seriously injured when two Hamas gunmen opened fire in the typically serene, tree-lined streets of Jaffa. While we anticipate potential further large-scale direct confrontations between Israel and Iran, the events in Jaffa suggest that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are adapting and likely shifting towards a more “asymmetrical” strategy, as described by foreign policy analysts.
This shift means that Israel's adversaries elevate their losses as victories, venerating their martyrs or shahid. Facing traditional capabilities that may be overwhelmed, these groups often turn to guerrilla tactics akin to those used by Mao Zedong in China or Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, as well as the terrorism tactics employed by jihadist organizations, including suicide bombings and complicated attacks against vulnerable civilian targets.
Indeed, this evolution is already happening and poses increased danger to the U.S. rather than Israel. In the 1980s, Hezbollah orchestrated the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon, killed U.S. Marines, kidnapped Westerners, tortured a CIA station chief to death, and hijacked commercial flights. The 1994 attack on Argentina’s Jewish Community Center by Hezbollah killed 85, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, supported by IRGC and Hezbollah, resulted in the deaths of 19 U.S. service members. These incidents led Hezbollah and Iran to effectively drive the U.S. military presence out of Lebanon without relying on conventional arms.
Calls for Washington to launch a significant attack against Iran—either independently or in conjunction with Israel—might overlook critical lessons from the past. It’s essential to recall that the U.S. maintains numerous facilities, personnel, and assets in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and other regions of the Middle East that Israel does not, such as embassies and important military bases, along with a considerable presence of American businesses and citizens. This gives Iran and Hezbollah far more U.S. targets than Israeli ones in locations where they hold advantages and where the U.S. has limited defenses.
Terrorist groups typically maintain a low profile and have little to lose apart from their leadership and covert operatives who blend in. However, Hezbollah has evolved into a significant military and political entity, bringing with it both military and political advantages from Iranian support. This transformation has also introduced what intelligence analysts refer to as “equities”—tangible political, economic, or physical investments—creating new vulnerabilities that they did not previously have.
Now, Hezbollah stands to lose considerably more and has made it easier for adversaries, as Israel has demonstrated with its recent successful operations.
The ongoing conflict increases the likelihood that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, might consider advancing his nation’s nuclear program militarily. Such a decision could become increasingly viable for him the more Iran faces disproportionate losses from its entanglements with Israel and the U.S. While Iran might seek to keep any intentions regarding nuclear armament under wraps, U.S. and Israeli intelligence would likely uncover these plans relatively quickly, raising the question: then what?
If the U.S. adheres to its established rhetoric, echoed by Israel, stating that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is intolerable, a significant military confrontation appears inevitable. Both Iran and the U.S. could find themselves cornered politically, nullifying the chances for a graceful exit. Khamenei would be unable to backtrack without facing severe domestic backlash, while Washington would feel compelled to take military action.
Regarding the ongoing fighting, there's no need to speculate about whether the conflict will escalate into all-out war; it has already done so. We are not witnessing miscalculations that lead to unintended escalation, nor should we assume that the involved parties have a mutual interest in de-escalation. Israel is fully engaged in warfare, compelling Iran and Hezbollah to respond in kind. For Netanyahu, what may have initially been a decision influenced by the desire to mitigate potential political fallout stemming from the October 7 attacks has morphed into a much larger conflict.
Israeli officials describe the nation’s recent, unprecedented, and escalating military actions as reactive and rooted in self-defense, aimed at restoring deterrence. However, they have also acknowledged that they had been monitoring Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for some time prior to his targeted elimination. Likewise, the comprehensive assault on Hezbollah members through hacked communication devices was a strategic effort years in the making; anonymous Israeli officials indicated that they chose to trigger these devices due to growing suspicions that could expose their operation.
While there was rationale and historical precedent for Israel’s earlier restraint regarding Nasrallah—“better the devil you know”—the tipping point likely stemmed from Netanyahu’s calculation that short-term consequences could be managed. The Israeli leader opted to abandon diplomatic consideration and appeared to find expansionism toward conflict with Iran advantageous, particularly if it compelled the U.S. to join. With the U.S. elections on the horizon, Netanyahu likely felt protected against immediate ramifications from the White House. What could President Joe Biden realistically do against Netanyahu with the election looming? Any punitive actions could bolster Republican narratives of his supposed leniency towards Iran and its proxies, creating tension within the Democratic base at the potential cost of crucial votes.
Israel's aggressive warfare strategy is unlikely to eliminate or deter Iran and its proxies effectively, with future threats potentially becoming harder to preempt or resolve diplomatically. The cycle of violence in the region is often driven not by logic and pragmatism, but rather by emotion, vengeance, and the need to save face. Iran's authoritarian clerical regime relies on instilling fear and maintaining its commitment to the destruction of Israel and resistance against the U.S. for its legitimacy and survival. Groups that brand themselves as “resistance organizations” must continuously engage in opposition to remain relevant.
In this context, U.S. interests are significantly impacted by Israeli tactics. The extensive injuries and destruction among Lebanese and Palestinian populations put additional pressure on potential Arab allies to distance themselves from both Israel and the U.S., despite historical hostilities towards groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Egypt's military leadership ousted a Muslim Brotherhood administration—Hamas’s ideological parent—while Jordan expelled Hamas leaders years prior. Moreover, Gulf Arab monarchies have seen Hezbollah as a significant threat.
In light of the harrowing visuals from recent conflicts, Arab nations are unlikely to deepen ties under the Abraham Accords negotiated during the Trump administration or align publicly with Israel. Each intense confrontation, with its ramifications—collapsed buildings, rescue workers recovering victims—moves Saudi recognition of Israel further out of reach, diminishing opportunities for a broader resolution to the conflict. The significance of this lies in Saudi Arabia's pivotal role in the Arab world, given its stewardship of Islam's two holiest sites and its vast financial resources, which confer substantial influence. A Saudi deal recognizing Israel, contingent on legitimate Palestinian statehood through a “two-state” solution, could enable transformative regional change.
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman often expresses disdain for Hamas, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and sees Iranian proxies as the primary external threats to the kingdom. His attitude towards the Palestinian cause seems more pragmatic than sympathetic, adjusted since he took power in 2017. However, MBS remains open to brokering a deal with Israel, reflecting a long history of discreet security collaborations against Iran. Nevertheless, such a move could provoke a violent backlash domestically.
The regional war also bears consequences for the U.S. regarding global strategic competition. It could draw Iran and the U.S. into a major confrontation, potentially inviting the involvement of Russia and China in this proxy conflict. Furthermore, the inability of the U.S. to influence Israeli actions erodes American credibility with Arab nations, a trend that extends far beyond the immediate conflict and affects other issues including strategic competition, energy policy, economic relations, and climate change.
While Washington can't retreat from its commitment to Israel's security, it must seek to regain influence by halting the ongoing violence and escalation, making politically tough choices that involve leveraging both incentives and consequences. Achieving better outcomes might necessitate operating in the shadows. Military actions and Israel’s high-profile assassinations of Iranian officials and entities intentionally provoke Iranian responses. In contrast, covert operations, such as the Stuxnet cyberattack against Iran's nuclear program—uncovered in 2010—and targeted executions with less notoriety, often yield more substantial results without inciting large-scale violence or forcing Iran's hand into open conflict.
The right to self-defense is universally recognized as an international norm, yet excessive military responses can lead to significant bloodshed, breeding longstanding grievances and animosities. During my extensive tenure in the CIA, I observed U.S. engagement in wars across various countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. While the U.S. won most militarily, it arguably lost more conflicts than it won, with the notable exception of the first Gulf War.
Americans and Israelis must clarify what they define as security and identify long-term solutions that can be implemented reasonably and effectively. Military force and intelligence are vital components, but they require a calculated approach that acknowledges potential second-order consequences. Simply vanquishing enemies and winning battles is insufficient for winning wars in today’s complex landscape. There are alternative strategies for Israel and the U.S. to counter Hezbollah and mitigate the Iranian threat, preserving avenues for lasting solutions. However, if Netanyahu maintains his current approach and Washington remains entangled in it, the ensuing costs will impact not only Israelis but also Americans.
Rohan Mehta contributed to this report for TROIB News
