‘That Would Give Trump Pause’: Strategies for Anticipating the Next Trade War
A comparison of the contentious dynamics between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, exploring the potential outcomes of their rivalry. It delves into their leadership styles, political strategies, and the implications for global relations. Readers will discover key insights into who might emerge victorious in this ongoing geopolitical struggle.
TroibNews 
Donald Trump initiated a two-year trade conflict with China during his first term as President, and he appears ready to embark on a similar path again.
Prior to taking office, Trump threatened China with a range of tariffs, including 60 percent tariffs to address its trade surplus, a 10 percent tariff contingent on halting fentanyl shipments, and a 100 percent tariff if China attempted to compete with the dollar as a global currency. On his second day in office, he announced that the first wave of tariffs would be implemented on February 1.
While these threats may be viewed as bluster or negotiation tactics, Trump's unpredictability can amplify their impact. In his first trade war, he enacted tariffs at levels not seen since the 1930s, aiming to compel China to comply with U.S. demands. In response, China enacted its own tariffs. U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods escalated six-fold to 19.3 percent, while Chinese tariffs on U.S. products almost tripled to 21.1 percent, leading to market volatility, challenges for U.S. companies reliant on imports, and a modest rise in inflation.
The standoff concluded with an inconclusive Phase One trade agreement that saw some agricultural and financial regulatory changes from China, but it fell well short of the large-scale U.S. purchases that had been promised. Trump had hoped for a Phase Two deal that would entail more significant changes, but this prospect faded amid pandemic lockdowns and mutual accusations surrounding the origin of the coronavirus.
During that trade conflict, I was stationed in Washington for the Wall Street Journal and collaborated with my colleague Lingling Wei, based in Beijing, to cover the situation extensively and co-author a book titled "Superpower Showdown."
The key dynamics from the previous trade war are expected to influence the upcoming one. While certain aspects may unfold differently, many strategies will echo the earlier confrontations between Trump and Xi Jinping.
**The “Great Man Theory” Will Shape the Jousting**
Historians have long debated whether individuals shape historical moments or are shaped by them. For Donald Trump, who has affixed his name to everything from towering buildings to water bottles to educational institutions, the answer is clear: he views international relations as contests among powerful individuals, influenced by flattery and threats.
During the initial trade war, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, experienced Trump's unique approach firsthand. After his inauguration, Trump hosted Xi at his Mar-a-Lago estate for extensive discussions, where their conversations coincided with Trump launching 59 missiles at Syria in response to a gas attack, a demonstration of American might aimed at reminding Xi of U.S. capabilities.
Trump, however, instructed his advisers to avoid singling out China in tariff discussions and employed flattery to encourage Xi to find common ground.
Advisers also heeded counsel from Henry Kissinger, who emphasized utilizing unpredictability as a strategic advantage. "Don’t make them not nervous, because that could be a strategic advantage for President Trump," Kissinger advised Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.
Xi, a staunch Marxist, might have typically understood that leaders are molded by underlying economic forces rather than dictating them. Yet he too views himself as an architect of history, pursuing what he refers to as his "China dream" of national rejuvenation. For many years, the U.S. had facilitated that vision by allowing Chinese goods into its markets, and he sought to preserve that dynamic.
“We have a thousand reasons to get the China-U.S. relationship right and not one reason to spoil it,” Xi told Trump during their Mar-a-Lago meeting.
Fast forward eight years, and both leaders have solidified their power. Notably, both are now more entrenched in their positions, with each having consolidated authority.
In contrast to the 2016 election, Trump secured the popular vote this time and is appointing officials who are well-versed in his style of governance.
As his first move, Trump extended an invitation to Xi for his inauguration, forcing China’s leader into a difficult situation. A positive response could portray Xi as weak, while a refusal would appear hostile. “It’s a classic move in how Trump deals with rivals,” remarked Matt Turpin, a China expert who served on Trump’s first National Security Council. Xi ultimately chose to remain home, sending his vice president in his place.
On the other side, Xi has utilized an extensive anti-corruption campaign to eliminate rivals, filling the Politburo Standing Committee with loyalists instead. As of 2023, he began his third presidential term, breaking a two-term precedent. When seeking foreign allies to assist with his China dream, he now gravitates toward Russia’s Vladimir Putin, with whom he has met more than 40 times. His reliance on the U.S. has diminished.
Xi has also embraced a new adage regarding the U.S.: “The East is rising; the West is declining.”
The implications are clear: both Trump and Xi may be less inclined to back down in future confrontations.
**The Real Battle in the Trade War Will Be Over Tech**
Trump, proudly proclaiming himself a “tariff man,” has long viewed tariffs as central to his political identity. During his first term, his primary demand from China was increased purchases of American goods to address its trade surplus of $375 billion with the U.S.
However, national security advisers during his presidency placed greater emphasis on maintaining a technological edge over China, which resulted in a mix of conflicting objectives.
Officials from the State Department and National Security Council lobbied allied nations to exclude Huawei Technologies Co. from their next-generation 5G telecom networks and pushed U.S. chipmakers to restrict their sales to China.
For Trump, though, these technological concerns were secondary to achieving higher purchase volumes. He intervened to halt the Commerce Department from placing crippling restrictions on another significant Chinese telecom entity, ZTE Corp., viewing the company’s fate as a potential bargaining chip in negotiations.
Once the preliminary trade deal with China faltered, Trump approved the NSC’s hardline stance on Huawei primarily out of frustration toward Xi.
“With Trump, it makes sense to seize on the low moments and come in with a stack of papers that advance your goals,” a senior U.S. security official noted during Trump’s first administration.
In contrast, technology has always been Xi's focal point.
Chinese negotiators frequently suggested buying more U.S. goods to meet Trump’s demands. Yet they also had ambitious technology aspirations, which they were unwilling to alter, regardless of tariffs. A 2015 report titled “Made in China 2025” outlined China’s ambitions to excel across ten pivotal tech sectors. Achieving this required trade agreements that ensured continued access to U.S. technological advancements.
Xi also aimed to maintain protective barriers around vital domestic tech markets. Chinese negotiators, for instance, consistently refused to lift restrictions on U.S. cloud computing, thereby providing domestic firms like Alibaba a competitive advantage.
Ahead of the next trade war, the competition over technology has intensified.
Over time, Trump’s administration increasingly blocked the export of advanced semiconductors and key technologies to China. The Biden administration built on these efforts, concluding its term with a series of measures designed to keep China technologically behind. Additionally, it sought to collaborate with allies.
However, it remains uncertain whether Trump’s focus on buy-more strategies has shifted. While he initially labeled Chinese-owned TikTok a security threat due to data privacy concerns, he reversed his stance during the 2024 campaign and announced plans to delay any ban on the platform. He has also suggested allowing Chinese electric vehicle companies to establish factories in the U.S., despite a Biden proposal to restrict Chinese EVs over similar data privacy worries related to TikTok.
For China, efforts to lessen reliance on foreign technology involve investing heavily in advanced research and providing substantial subsidies to its tech industries. As Scott Kennedy, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, estimated, China spent twelve times more than the U.S. on subsidies as a percentage of GDP in 2019.
In Trade War II, expect China to attempt to placate Trump with purchases while Trump’s advisers work to prevent him from settling for only that outcome.
**Trump and Xi Have Different Bottom Lines**
Trump’s objectives are straightforward. He perceives ongoing trade surpluses from China as evidence that the U.S. is being exploited. He employs tariffs as a means to diminish those surpluses, targeting not just China, but Mexico, the European Union, and India.
During 2024 congressional hearings, Jamieson Greer, Trump’s new nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, praised the Phase One deal, highlighting that the U.S. trade deficit with China had decreased by 25 percent from Trump’s first year. He omitted, however, that the overall U.S. trade deficit skyrocketed by one-third during the same period, as other nations filled the void left by China.
For Xi, the bottom line is also clear: he will not permit any substantial changes to China’s economic framework. He was willing to approve the Phase One agreement, which maintained tariffs on three-quarters of China’s exports to the U.S., as it did not require him to alter policies that he believed enriched China—policies like large subsidies, support for state-owned enterprises, and low-cost exports that undermine foreign competition.
As Trump moves into his second term, his focus remains on reducing the trade deficit. He is proposing tariffs of 60 percent on China, along with 10 percent or 20 percent tariffs on other countries. He views these tariffs as an entry fee for accessing the world’s largest consumer market, which he can waive if nations concede to his demands.
However, discourse among his advisers reveals divisions on how to enact these ideas into policy. Greer advocates for “strategic decoupling” from China with significantly increased tariffs. Scott Bessent, Trump’s nominee for Treasury Secretary, has suggested a comprehensive agreement encompassing China and other trade partners, which he terms a “Mar-a-Lago accord.” Meanwhile, Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief aide, promotes a tougher version of the Phase One arrangement. Moreover, the influence of Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who has cultivated strong business relations in China, adds unpredictability regarding Trump’s potential decisions.
At this point, Trump has yet to commit to any specific plans. The initial set of executive orders calls for numerous studies that will take months to complete, likely allowing his advisers the opportunity to advocate for diverse positions.
“President Trump will work quickly to fix and restore an economy that puts American workers first by re-shoring American jobs,” asserts his press secretary, Karoline Leavitt. Interpret that as you will.
On the Chinese side, Xi is now more firmly devoted than ever to a state-led model prioritizing technology and exports. This approach renders him more vulnerable in a trade conflict since tariffs can hinder export-driven growth. He has sought to shield China from new U.S. tariffs by pursuing free-trade agreements with Asian nations, but no single market can effectively substitute for the U.S.
Ultimately, we should anticipate a recurrence of the last trade war, characterized by infighting among Trump’s advisers regarding the administration's objectives while China steadfastly resists change.
**Key Guardrails May Constrain Both Leaders**
During Trump’s initial term, both sides established guardrails that prevented the trade war from escalating uncontrollably. For Trump, the stock market served as a crucial check on his actions.
The continued rise of the stock market after the U.S. began imposing tariffs in July 2018 gave Trump a sense of validation. However, their decline later that year sparked concern among companies over tariff-related repercussions. National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow reassured investors on Fox, suggesting a potential Trump-Xi meeting at a G-20 summit in Buenos Aires might offer a path to mitigating the trade war.
Following their encounter, Trump hinted in a December 4 tweet that a deal might be forthcoming, but he added a crucial reminder: “But if not, remember I am a Tariff Man.” Subsequently, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 800 points, with the S&P declining by 3.2 percent — its second-largest drop of the year. Towards the year’s end, Trump attempted to bolster market confidence by announcing renewed negotiations with Xi, prompting a 265-point surge in the Dow the next trading day.
“What are the benchmarks for success of the presidency?” Trump’s first NEC director, Gary Cohn, posed in a radio interview in March 2019. “The stock market is the most obvious, most transparent, most-talked-about-by-the-president benchmark of success.”
While the Chinese government lacks the transparency of its American counterpart, Xi's guardrails can be inferred from his actions. Throughout the trade conflict, Xi remained concerned about deterring the foreign investment crucial for China's growth. Although he mirrored Trump’s tariffs, he refrained from wielding his full potential by avoiding actions that could damage major American firms like Apple or General Motors.
As we look ahead to 2025, the stock market remains vital for Trump; however, it has become more susceptible to Chinese influence. Currently, the top seven companies in the S&P 500 account for 28 percent of the index’s weight, compared to about half that in 2017. Many of these companies, including Apple, Tesla, and Nvidia, rely heavily on China for profit.
“If China threatens a handful of very big American companies and the stock market falls, that would give Trump pause,” observes Derek Scissors, a China analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.
Nevertheless, such actions would be perilous for Xi. In 2017, China’s economy was growing by nearly 7 percent, and foreign investment was thriving. Today, growth has sunk below 5 percent, the real estate sector has collapsed, government debt is surging, and demand and supply imbalances pose risks of deflation. Foreign investment hit a 30-year low in 2023 and continued to drop in the first half of 2024.
The last thing Xi wants is to drive away foreign firms with blunt tactics. So far, his actions appear more performative than impactful.
While he has imposed sanctions on U.S. defense companies preventing them from operating in China and moved to curtail the export of key minerals required for advanced technology, these military contractors are not particularly dependent on China for sales. Additionally, U.S. tech companies rarely source minerals directly from China; they purchase these materials from foreign electronics firms for component production.
“Xi Jinping’s standing depends on how people feel about the economy,” says a U.S. business executive who frequently visits China and requested anonymity for candidness. “In the same way the stock market is a guardrail for Trump, the growth rate is a guardrail for Xi.”
This indicates that even as both Trump and Xi feel increasingly empowered politically, the constraints of the global economy remain rigid. A new trade war is nearly inevitable; the question now lies in how damaging it will become.
Navid Kalantari for TROIB News
Prior to taking office, Trump threatened China with a range of tariffs, including 60 percent tariffs to address its trade surplus, a 10 percent tariff contingent on halting fentanyl shipments, and a 100 percent tariff if China attempted to compete with the dollar as a global currency. On his second day in office, he announced that the first wave of tariffs would be implemented on February 1.
While these threats may be viewed as bluster or negotiation tactics, Trump's unpredictability can amplify their impact. In his first trade war, he enacted tariffs at levels not seen since the 1930s, aiming to compel China to comply with U.S. demands. In response, China enacted its own tariffs. U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods escalated six-fold to 19.3 percent, while Chinese tariffs on U.S. products almost tripled to 21.1 percent, leading to market volatility, challenges for U.S. companies reliant on imports, and a modest rise in inflation.
The standoff concluded with an inconclusive Phase One trade agreement that saw some agricultural and financial regulatory changes from China, but it fell well short of the large-scale U.S. purchases that had been promised. Trump had hoped for a Phase Two deal that would entail more significant changes, but this prospect faded amid pandemic lockdowns and mutual accusations surrounding the origin of the coronavirus.
During that trade conflict, I was stationed in Washington for the Wall Street Journal and collaborated with my colleague Lingling Wei, based in Beijing, to cover the situation extensively and co-author a book titled "Superpower Showdown."
The key dynamics from the previous trade war are expected to influence the upcoming one. While certain aspects may unfold differently, many strategies will echo the earlier confrontations between Trump and Xi Jinping.
**The “Great Man Theory” Will Shape the Jousting**
Historians have long debated whether individuals shape historical moments or are shaped by them. For Donald Trump, who has affixed his name to everything from towering buildings to water bottles to educational institutions, the answer is clear: he views international relations as contests among powerful individuals, influenced by flattery and threats.
During the initial trade war, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, experienced Trump's unique approach firsthand. After his inauguration, Trump hosted Xi at his Mar-a-Lago estate for extensive discussions, where their conversations coincided with Trump launching 59 missiles at Syria in response to a gas attack, a demonstration of American might aimed at reminding Xi of U.S. capabilities.
Trump, however, instructed his advisers to avoid singling out China in tariff discussions and employed flattery to encourage Xi to find common ground.
Advisers also heeded counsel from Henry Kissinger, who emphasized utilizing unpredictability as a strategic advantage. "Don’t make them not nervous, because that could be a strategic advantage for President Trump," Kissinger advised Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.
Xi, a staunch Marxist, might have typically understood that leaders are molded by underlying economic forces rather than dictating them. Yet he too views himself as an architect of history, pursuing what he refers to as his "China dream" of national rejuvenation. For many years, the U.S. had facilitated that vision by allowing Chinese goods into its markets, and he sought to preserve that dynamic.
“We have a thousand reasons to get the China-U.S. relationship right and not one reason to spoil it,” Xi told Trump during their Mar-a-Lago meeting.
Fast forward eight years, and both leaders have solidified their power. Notably, both are now more entrenched in their positions, with each having consolidated authority.
In contrast to the 2016 election, Trump secured the popular vote this time and is appointing officials who are well-versed in his style of governance.
As his first move, Trump extended an invitation to Xi for his inauguration, forcing China’s leader into a difficult situation. A positive response could portray Xi as weak, while a refusal would appear hostile. “It’s a classic move in how Trump deals with rivals,” remarked Matt Turpin, a China expert who served on Trump’s first National Security Council. Xi ultimately chose to remain home, sending his vice president in his place.
On the other side, Xi has utilized an extensive anti-corruption campaign to eliminate rivals, filling the Politburo Standing Committee with loyalists instead. As of 2023, he began his third presidential term, breaking a two-term precedent. When seeking foreign allies to assist with his China dream, he now gravitates toward Russia’s Vladimir Putin, with whom he has met more than 40 times. His reliance on the U.S. has diminished.
Xi has also embraced a new adage regarding the U.S.: “The East is rising; the West is declining.”
The implications are clear: both Trump and Xi may be less inclined to back down in future confrontations.
**The Real Battle in the Trade War Will Be Over Tech**
Trump, proudly proclaiming himself a “tariff man,” has long viewed tariffs as central to his political identity. During his first term, his primary demand from China was increased purchases of American goods to address its trade surplus of $375 billion with the U.S.
However, national security advisers during his presidency placed greater emphasis on maintaining a technological edge over China, which resulted in a mix of conflicting objectives.
Officials from the State Department and National Security Council lobbied allied nations to exclude Huawei Technologies Co. from their next-generation 5G telecom networks and pushed U.S. chipmakers to restrict their sales to China.
For Trump, though, these technological concerns were secondary to achieving higher purchase volumes. He intervened to halt the Commerce Department from placing crippling restrictions on another significant Chinese telecom entity, ZTE Corp., viewing the company’s fate as a potential bargaining chip in negotiations.
Once the preliminary trade deal with China faltered, Trump approved the NSC’s hardline stance on Huawei primarily out of frustration toward Xi.
“With Trump, it makes sense to seize on the low moments and come in with a stack of papers that advance your goals,” a senior U.S. security official noted during Trump’s first administration.
In contrast, technology has always been Xi's focal point.
Chinese negotiators frequently suggested buying more U.S. goods to meet Trump’s demands. Yet they also had ambitious technology aspirations, which they were unwilling to alter, regardless of tariffs. A 2015 report titled “Made in China 2025” outlined China’s ambitions to excel across ten pivotal tech sectors. Achieving this required trade agreements that ensured continued access to U.S. technological advancements.
Xi also aimed to maintain protective barriers around vital domestic tech markets. Chinese negotiators, for instance, consistently refused to lift restrictions on U.S. cloud computing, thereby providing domestic firms like Alibaba a competitive advantage.
Ahead of the next trade war, the competition over technology has intensified.
Over time, Trump’s administration increasingly blocked the export of advanced semiconductors and key technologies to China. The Biden administration built on these efforts, concluding its term with a series of measures designed to keep China technologically behind. Additionally, it sought to collaborate with allies.
However, it remains uncertain whether Trump’s focus on buy-more strategies has shifted. While he initially labeled Chinese-owned TikTok a security threat due to data privacy concerns, he reversed his stance during the 2024 campaign and announced plans to delay any ban on the platform. He has also suggested allowing Chinese electric vehicle companies to establish factories in the U.S., despite a Biden proposal to restrict Chinese EVs over similar data privacy worries related to TikTok.
For China, efforts to lessen reliance on foreign technology involve investing heavily in advanced research and providing substantial subsidies to its tech industries. As Scott Kennedy, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, estimated, China spent twelve times more than the U.S. on subsidies as a percentage of GDP in 2019.
In Trade War II, expect China to attempt to placate Trump with purchases while Trump’s advisers work to prevent him from settling for only that outcome.
**Trump and Xi Have Different Bottom Lines**
Trump’s objectives are straightforward. He perceives ongoing trade surpluses from China as evidence that the U.S. is being exploited. He employs tariffs as a means to diminish those surpluses, targeting not just China, but Mexico, the European Union, and India.
During 2024 congressional hearings, Jamieson Greer, Trump’s new nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, praised the Phase One deal, highlighting that the U.S. trade deficit with China had decreased by 25 percent from Trump’s first year. He omitted, however, that the overall U.S. trade deficit skyrocketed by one-third during the same period, as other nations filled the void left by China.
For Xi, the bottom line is also clear: he will not permit any substantial changes to China’s economic framework. He was willing to approve the Phase One agreement, which maintained tariffs on three-quarters of China’s exports to the U.S., as it did not require him to alter policies that he believed enriched China—policies like large subsidies, support for state-owned enterprises, and low-cost exports that undermine foreign competition.
As Trump moves into his second term, his focus remains on reducing the trade deficit. He is proposing tariffs of 60 percent on China, along with 10 percent or 20 percent tariffs on other countries. He views these tariffs as an entry fee for accessing the world’s largest consumer market, which he can waive if nations concede to his demands.
However, discourse among his advisers reveals divisions on how to enact these ideas into policy. Greer advocates for “strategic decoupling” from China with significantly increased tariffs. Scott Bessent, Trump’s nominee for Treasury Secretary, has suggested a comprehensive agreement encompassing China and other trade partners, which he terms a “Mar-a-Lago accord.” Meanwhile, Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief aide, promotes a tougher version of the Phase One arrangement. Moreover, the influence of Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who has cultivated strong business relations in China, adds unpredictability regarding Trump’s potential decisions.
At this point, Trump has yet to commit to any specific plans. The initial set of executive orders calls for numerous studies that will take months to complete, likely allowing his advisers the opportunity to advocate for diverse positions.
“President Trump will work quickly to fix and restore an economy that puts American workers first by re-shoring American jobs,” asserts his press secretary, Karoline Leavitt. Interpret that as you will.
On the Chinese side, Xi is now more firmly devoted than ever to a state-led model prioritizing technology and exports. This approach renders him more vulnerable in a trade conflict since tariffs can hinder export-driven growth. He has sought to shield China from new U.S. tariffs by pursuing free-trade agreements with Asian nations, but no single market can effectively substitute for the U.S.
Ultimately, we should anticipate a recurrence of the last trade war, characterized by infighting among Trump’s advisers regarding the administration's objectives while China steadfastly resists change.
**Key Guardrails May Constrain Both Leaders**
During Trump’s initial term, both sides established guardrails that prevented the trade war from escalating uncontrollably. For Trump, the stock market served as a crucial check on his actions.
The continued rise of the stock market after the U.S. began imposing tariffs in July 2018 gave Trump a sense of validation. However, their decline later that year sparked concern among companies over tariff-related repercussions. National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow reassured investors on Fox, suggesting a potential Trump-Xi meeting at a G-20 summit in Buenos Aires might offer a path to mitigating the trade war.
Following their encounter, Trump hinted in a December 4 tweet that a deal might be forthcoming, but he added a crucial reminder: “But if not, remember I am a Tariff Man.” Subsequently, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 800 points, with the S&P declining by 3.2 percent — its second-largest drop of the year. Towards the year’s end, Trump attempted to bolster market confidence by announcing renewed negotiations with Xi, prompting a 265-point surge in the Dow the next trading day.
“What are the benchmarks for success of the presidency?” Trump’s first NEC director, Gary Cohn, posed in a radio interview in March 2019. “The stock market is the most obvious, most transparent, most-talked-about-by-the-president benchmark of success.”
While the Chinese government lacks the transparency of its American counterpart, Xi's guardrails can be inferred from his actions. Throughout the trade conflict, Xi remained concerned about deterring the foreign investment crucial for China's growth. Although he mirrored Trump’s tariffs, he refrained from wielding his full potential by avoiding actions that could damage major American firms like Apple or General Motors.
As we look ahead to 2025, the stock market remains vital for Trump; however, it has become more susceptible to Chinese influence. Currently, the top seven companies in the S&P 500 account for 28 percent of the index’s weight, compared to about half that in 2017. Many of these companies, including Apple, Tesla, and Nvidia, rely heavily on China for profit.
“If China threatens a handful of very big American companies and the stock market falls, that would give Trump pause,” observes Derek Scissors, a China analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.
Nevertheless, such actions would be perilous for Xi. In 2017, China’s economy was growing by nearly 7 percent, and foreign investment was thriving. Today, growth has sunk below 5 percent, the real estate sector has collapsed, government debt is surging, and demand and supply imbalances pose risks of deflation. Foreign investment hit a 30-year low in 2023 and continued to drop in the first half of 2024.
The last thing Xi wants is to drive away foreign firms with blunt tactics. So far, his actions appear more performative than impactful.
While he has imposed sanctions on U.S. defense companies preventing them from operating in China and moved to curtail the export of key minerals required for advanced technology, these military contractors are not particularly dependent on China for sales. Additionally, U.S. tech companies rarely source minerals directly from China; they purchase these materials from foreign electronics firms for component production.
“Xi Jinping’s standing depends on how people feel about the economy,” says a U.S. business executive who frequently visits China and requested anonymity for candidness. “In the same way the stock market is a guardrail for Trump, the growth rate is a guardrail for Xi.”
This indicates that even as both Trump and Xi feel increasingly empowered politically, the constraints of the global economy remain rigid. A new trade war is nearly inevitable; the question now lies in how damaging it will become.
Navid Kalantari for TROIB News
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