It's the deep state, stupid: Why US foreign policy is unlikely to shift significantly with Trump
Tactical adjustments are anticipated from the administration of the 47th president; however, a significant shift in strategic direction is not expected. Read Full Article at RT.com
TroibNews 
Tactical shifts are anticipated from the administration of the 47th president, yet a substantial change in the strategic course of US foreign policy is improbable.
Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election has sparked unease among proponents of the Biden administration's current foreign policy stance and has ignited hopes for a transformation among those advocating for change.
The crucial question—echoing in American political discussions and among allies and adversaries on the global stage—is how much alteration in US foreign policy can be expected from a new Republican administration.
Many analysts, leveraging Trump’s and his campaign team’s assertive rhetoric, predict that if he returns to the presidency, considerable policy alterations will occur. However, even with a Republican majority in both congressional chambers, it seems unlikely that Trump will realize all his ambitions in this sphere.
In theory, Trump's potential resurgence to the presidency occurs amid favorable circumstances for enacting his foreign policy vision. Republicans not only bolster their majority in the House of Representatives but also reclaim control of the Senate, key for influencing foreign policy through the confirmation of critical appointments and treaty ratifications.
Current anxieties about significant changes in foreign policy recall Trump’s first term, during which his bold assertions were seen as potential shifts but ultimately did not lead to clear changes. Upon reentering the White House, Trump is anticipated to revive the “America First” framework in foreign policy, indicating a more practical approach to international matters without necessarily overhauling the fundamental goals and priorities of foreign policy.
Expectations of radical transformations in US foreign policy after Trump’s 2016 victory proved unfounded. He pledged to dismantle NATO, build closer ties with Russia, and adopt a firmer stance on China. Trump made a point of criticizing European nations for inadequate defense spending and frequently threatened to diminish the US role in NATO.
Again, he may urge NATO nations to boost their defense expenditures, arguing that the US should not shoulder the primary burden. This strategy previously caused tensions within the alliance and resulted in a redistribution of responsibilities, ultimately reinforcing NATO by motivating a greater European commitment to their security.
Trump also expressed a wish to foster closer relations with Moscow, praising Putin and seeking a new nuclear arms control treaty that included China. However, these ambitions culminated in additional sanctions against Russia and boosted aid to Ukraine, precluding any significant thaw in US-Russia relations.
During his previous term, the US engaged in an active trade war with China, limited cooperation in advanced technology sectors, and adopted measures against Chinese influence in Asia and other regions. However, these confrontational steps were a logical extension of the containment policy and the “pivot to Asia” strategy initiated by the Obama administration, indicating that they do not qualify as a major policy shift.
One of the key foreign policy focuses of Trump’s second term would be the situation in Ukraine. While campaigning, Trump asserted he could swiftly bring an end to the conflict with Russia as president. Nevertheless, he also stated he would not commit to increasing aid to Ukraine, insisting that European nations ought to take on a greater share of its support.
Trump’s rapport with Russia is marked by contradictions. He has pursued warmer ties with Putin, repeatedly conveying admiration for him, while also denouncing Russia's actions in Ukraine as a “huge mistake” on Putin's part. This inconsistency, coupled with critical remarks about Ukraine from Trump’s advisors, has generated uncertainty regarding the potential stance of a new Republican administration.
Trump is likely to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, attempting to leverage Kiev’s reliance on US military and economic support and suggesting that the cessation of such aid could facilitate a peace agreement.
Such a peace arrangement might be less favorable to Ukraine compared to conditions a year ago. With recent developments appearing to tip the balance in Russia's favor, Ukraine’s territorial losses indicate that future negotiations could yield tougher terms for Kiev than would have been possible earlier.
If this scenario unfolds, like in other critical areas, it wouldn't imply a major shift in US foreign policy.
The Biden administration has already exhibited signs of “Ukraine fatigue,” indicating weariness with the costly backing for Kiev. Public opinion in the US also shows a declining willingness to maintain present aid levels for Ukraine. Even had there been a Democratic victory in the presidential election, with Kamala Harris assuming the presidency and Democrats keeping Congress, the support for Ukraine would likely continue its gradual decrease.
The Trump administration may pursue a strategy emphasizing a more pragmatic resolution of the Ukraine conflict. This approach would likely merge reduced military aid with active diplomatic efforts, which, if fruitful, would enable Trump to present an “effective resolution” of the conflict. However, for Ukraine and its allies, this strategy might translate into greater pressure on Kiev to reach a compromise, which could undermine its negotiating position and shift the regional power dynamics.
The principal constraint on radical alterations in US foreign policy stems from institutional inertia within the decision-making framework. US foreign policy is heavily bureaucratic and cannot function independently of diverse influence groups' interests. While the president has considerable authority, he must navigate the complexities of Congress for significant foreign policy decisions. Additionally, the entrenched influence of the deep state on foreign policy retains considerable weight.
In Congress, there exists a bipartisan consensus on crucial aspects of US foreign policy: the containment of Russia and China, sustained support for NATO, and backing for Israel. This consensus enables only tactical adjustments while maintaining the overarching strategic framework.
Thus, a second Trump term would likely result in a more practical foreign policy. His administration would probably take a firmer stance on China, scale back support for Ukraine, redistribute responsibilities within NATO, and decrease US involvement in global alliances and agreements.
While these potential changes may seem significant, they will not signify a complete restructuring of long-standing US foreign policy direction.
Lucas Dupont contributed to this report for TROIB News
Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election has sparked unease among proponents of the Biden administration's current foreign policy stance and has ignited hopes for a transformation among those advocating for change.
The crucial question—echoing in American political discussions and among allies and adversaries on the global stage—is how much alteration in US foreign policy can be expected from a new Republican administration.
Many analysts, leveraging Trump’s and his campaign team’s assertive rhetoric, predict that if he returns to the presidency, considerable policy alterations will occur. However, even with a Republican majority in both congressional chambers, it seems unlikely that Trump will realize all his ambitions in this sphere.
In theory, Trump's potential resurgence to the presidency occurs amid favorable circumstances for enacting his foreign policy vision. Republicans not only bolster their majority in the House of Representatives but also reclaim control of the Senate, key for influencing foreign policy through the confirmation of critical appointments and treaty ratifications.
Current anxieties about significant changes in foreign policy recall Trump’s first term, during which his bold assertions were seen as potential shifts but ultimately did not lead to clear changes. Upon reentering the White House, Trump is anticipated to revive the “America First” framework in foreign policy, indicating a more practical approach to international matters without necessarily overhauling the fundamental goals and priorities of foreign policy.
Expectations of radical transformations in US foreign policy after Trump’s 2016 victory proved unfounded. He pledged to dismantle NATO, build closer ties with Russia, and adopt a firmer stance on China. Trump made a point of criticizing European nations for inadequate defense spending and frequently threatened to diminish the US role in NATO.
Again, he may urge NATO nations to boost their defense expenditures, arguing that the US should not shoulder the primary burden. This strategy previously caused tensions within the alliance and resulted in a redistribution of responsibilities, ultimately reinforcing NATO by motivating a greater European commitment to their security.
Trump also expressed a wish to foster closer relations with Moscow, praising Putin and seeking a new nuclear arms control treaty that included China. However, these ambitions culminated in additional sanctions against Russia and boosted aid to Ukraine, precluding any significant thaw in US-Russia relations.
During his previous term, the US engaged in an active trade war with China, limited cooperation in advanced technology sectors, and adopted measures against Chinese influence in Asia and other regions. However, these confrontational steps were a logical extension of the containment policy and the “pivot to Asia” strategy initiated by the Obama administration, indicating that they do not qualify as a major policy shift.
One of the key foreign policy focuses of Trump’s second term would be the situation in Ukraine. While campaigning, Trump asserted he could swiftly bring an end to the conflict with Russia as president. Nevertheless, he also stated he would not commit to increasing aid to Ukraine, insisting that European nations ought to take on a greater share of its support.
Trump’s rapport with Russia is marked by contradictions. He has pursued warmer ties with Putin, repeatedly conveying admiration for him, while also denouncing Russia's actions in Ukraine as a “huge mistake” on Putin's part. This inconsistency, coupled with critical remarks about Ukraine from Trump’s advisors, has generated uncertainty regarding the potential stance of a new Republican administration.
Trump is likely to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, attempting to leverage Kiev’s reliance on US military and economic support and suggesting that the cessation of such aid could facilitate a peace agreement.
Such a peace arrangement might be less favorable to Ukraine compared to conditions a year ago. With recent developments appearing to tip the balance in Russia's favor, Ukraine’s territorial losses indicate that future negotiations could yield tougher terms for Kiev than would have been possible earlier.
If this scenario unfolds, like in other critical areas, it wouldn't imply a major shift in US foreign policy.
The Biden administration has already exhibited signs of “Ukraine fatigue,” indicating weariness with the costly backing for Kiev. Public opinion in the US also shows a declining willingness to maintain present aid levels for Ukraine. Even had there been a Democratic victory in the presidential election, with Kamala Harris assuming the presidency and Democrats keeping Congress, the support for Ukraine would likely continue its gradual decrease.
The Trump administration may pursue a strategy emphasizing a more pragmatic resolution of the Ukraine conflict. This approach would likely merge reduced military aid with active diplomatic efforts, which, if fruitful, would enable Trump to present an “effective resolution” of the conflict. However, for Ukraine and its allies, this strategy might translate into greater pressure on Kiev to reach a compromise, which could undermine its negotiating position and shift the regional power dynamics.
The principal constraint on radical alterations in US foreign policy stems from institutional inertia within the decision-making framework. US foreign policy is heavily bureaucratic and cannot function independently of diverse influence groups' interests. While the president has considerable authority, he must navigate the complexities of Congress for significant foreign policy decisions. Additionally, the entrenched influence of the deep state on foreign policy retains considerable weight.
In Congress, there exists a bipartisan consensus on crucial aspects of US foreign policy: the containment of Russia and China, sustained support for NATO, and backing for Israel. This consensus enables only tactical adjustments while maintaining the overarching strategic framework.
Thus, a second Trump term would likely result in a more practical foreign policy. His administration would probably take a firmer stance on China, scale back support for Ukraine, redistribute responsibilities within NATO, and decrease US involvement in global alliances and agreements.
While these potential changes may seem significant, they will not signify a complete restructuring of long-standing US foreign policy direction.
Lucas Dupont contributed to this report for TROIB News
