Where the Next World War Begins

SEOUL — East Asia poses the greatest threat to global peace, with tensions here escalating to levels larger and more intense than what could emerge from conflicts in the Middle East or Europe.

In contrast to its mixed results in Ukraine and the Middle East or the setbacks in Afghanistan, the Biden administration has established a significant diplomatic legacy in Asia. It has created extensive security alliances throughout the region aimed at deterring China and has achieved a rapprochement between historical rivals South Korea and Japan, something that has eluded leaders for decades.

Challenges abound for Joe Biden’s successor in this theater. The military forces arrayed against one another in the northern Pacific are formidable. China is forging a tighter alliance with North Korea and Russia, making aggressive threats toward Taiwan and asserting its claims over the South China Sea. Developments in other geopolitical arenas, particularly the situation in Ukraine, will also impact East Asia.

Interestingly, the next U.S. administration's strategy is complicated by historical grievances. Japan and South Korea, both possessing strong militaries—Japan having recently begun a significant military buildup—are still affected by disputes from the previous century, leading to a potentially fragile partnership. The durability of their collaboration is in question, especially with the rising threats they face together.

Overlooking the hills that encircle Seoul lies the world's most heavily militarized zone. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) keeps the vibrant capital separate from a nuclear-armed North Korea, ruled by an unpredictable dictatorship that weighs heavily on the consciousness of Koreans.

The view from Tokyo is no more reassuring, especially these days.

Russian military aircraft regularly intrude into Japan's northwestern airspace, a stark reminder of the lingering territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands that has kept Japan and Russia technically at war for nearly 80 years. Additionally, China contests Japan's claim to the Senkaku Islands to the south, escalating tensions further. August witnessed a historic first incursion, with Chinese military aircraft breaching Japanese airspace, while Chinese and Russian naval vessels conducted joint exercises near Japanese waters in September. North Korea also openly sees Japan as an adversary, occasionally launching missiles over it.

“Japan is now facing off against North Korea, Russia, and China and that makes for a severe security environment,” stated Minoru Kihara, Japan’s defense minister until the change of government last month. “We feel a strong sense of crisis considering that such incidents took place in a short period of time.”

The invasion of Ukraine has shifted dynamics in Asia. Following Vladimir Putin’s military actions, Xi Jinping showed strong support for Russia against a united NATO, turning the European crisis into a test of China’s ambitions as a superpower. According to Kihara, Japan is “paying close attention to China’s alliance with Russia.” Moreover, the situation has further drawn North Korea and Moscow closer, with Kim Jong Un reportedly sending thousands of troops to Ukraine in exchange for military technology and other benefits.

The trilateral relationship with Seoul and Tokyo forms a crucial response to this formidable authoritarian alliance. While the U.S. has treaties protecting both Japan and South Korea for over 70 years and both nations share common enemies, historical grievances have led to long-standing estrangement. Japan’s occupation of Korea during World War II, along with the enslavement of Koreans for labor and sexual exploitation, remains a source of resentment. Japan has issued apologies and provided reparations, but these issues continue to strain political and military relationships.

Retired Adm. Jim Stavridis recounted that during his command of missile destroyer squadrons in the 1990s, the U.S. needed to maintain distance between Japanese and South Korean vessels during joint exercises to prevent what he described as “the on-the-sea version of ‘road rage.’” It is akin to if France and Germany had remained cool toward one another post-World War II, precluding the formation of NATO or the European Union.

The Xi era in China has transformed Japanese security perceptions, with the conflict in Ukraine acting as a recent catalyst.

Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida echoed lines from his foreign minister, stating “First Ukraine, then Taiwan,” warning that “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” This reflects concerns about Russia as China's key supporter and recognition of the growing challenge to the U.S.-led world order.

In response, Japan has announced plans to double its defense spending from 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, with a more than 40-percent increase since 2022. Japan, which has historically neglected its military due to its constitution mandating self-defense, has begun significant transformations. Under previous leader Shinzo Abe, Japan advanced its naval capabilities and modernized weaponry. If current expansion plans materialize, Japan could become the world’s third-largest military spender, following the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, Germany is reversing plans to increase its defense budget.

Despite this spending, “China is outpacing Japan’s increase of defense budget and they have four times more than we do,” Kihara remarked, highlighting the difficulties Japan faces in standing up to China independently.

South Korea emerges as a natural ally for Japan. Kishida recognized the need for closer relations, particularly in light of shared concerns regarding China. This shift was facilitated by the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol in March 2022, shortly after the invasion of Ukraine.

Korea's political landscape often experiences shifts as power changes hands between left and right factions every few years. The left typically seeks reconciliation with North Korea and is less favorable toward Japan, while Yoon, from the right, brought hawkish views and goodwill towards Japan, stemming from familial ties forged during his father's time spent there.

Their first meeting at the Madrid NATO summit in July 2022 was marked by an unexpected embrace, a rarity in Asian political gestures, which a former Korean official noted as a significant moment: “Yoon hugged him... Asian leaders don’t do hugs, unless they are communists.”

From this unorthodox beginning, what one former official described as a “drinking buddies” relationship blossomed. The U.S. had been seeking this breakthrough for years. Kurt Campbell, deputy secretary of State, advocated for rapprochement from Washington, leading to numerous trilateral meetings where the U.S. played a less central role than usual, facilitating discussions among Japan and South Korea, as noted by Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo.

Despite progress, the situation remains complex. Direct meetings between Korean and Japanese ministers have been infrequent. The lack of meetings underscored a long-standing estrangement that the U.S. often finds itself mediating. “History is history, brother,” Emanuel noted. “It has a pull on emotions and it has a pull on psychology.” He added, “The U.S. plays an important role in keeping the plates spinning.”

At the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May 2023, the U.S. urged for Korea’s invitation. The summit culminated in Yoon and Kishida visiting a memorial to Korean victims of the atomic bombing, a symbolic gesture representing progress.

The peak of this budding relationship transpired at the Camp David summit in August 2022, where Yoon, Kishida, and Biden hailed a new alliance and announced multiple agreements on missile data sharing and joint exercises. “This is an all hands on deck moment in the region,” commented one anonymous senior administration official.

Emanuel further emphasized the spirit of cooperation, saying, “When you have trust in us and in the president, you don’t do the bare minimum... In a world consumed by war and grievance, history can catch up to the present and shape it. Camp David showed dialogue and diplomacy shaped the future.” He added, “Now, the goal is to institutionalize it in the DNA of governments.”

However, the burgeoning alliance is still fragile, as leaders in Seoul and Tokyo express cautious sentiments. An anonymous senior Japanese official reflected, “I’m very pessimistic... The Koreans swing from one extreme to the other.” Yoon’s political opponents have accused him of capitulating to Japan, intensifying political pressures.

One foreign ministry official in Tokyo recalled lobbying efforts leading up to the Camp David summit, saying, “They would yell at us during negotiations... and when the meeting’s over, they say, ‘No hard feelings, let’s go out for drinks.’ The next day they yell at us some more.” These patterns highlight the domestic political complexities each side navigates.

Distrust regarding historical grievances transcends political parties and deeply entrenched divides persist. While military exercises have been agreed upon, Japanese forces are not welcomed on Korean soil, as one senior Korean official remarked, “We prefer to have them somewhere else.” When considering if Japan is an ally, the official hesitated: “Don’t think so. Partner is enough.”

Painful historical issues—particularly calls for reparations and apologies—continue to strain relations. Japan asserts these matters were already settled, preferring to distance itself from Korea's internal political mess.

The futures of both nations’ conciliatory efforts may hinge on the term of President Yoon, and Japan’s complex political landscape also complicates its relationships within Asia, particularly with nations wary of China's rise.

Japan’s contemporary awakening to defense mirrors its former wartime ally Germany in certain ways but also contrasts starkly in others. Ian Buruma's book, *Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, notes that elements attracting Japan to Germany pre-war, such as authoritarianism and nationalism, have remained in Japan even as similar sentiments have waned in Germany.

No Japanese leader has offered an apology akin to Willy Brandt's gesture in Warsaw, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a vocal nationalist faction that stirs discontent among Koreans and Chinese, particularly when LDP politicians visit the contentious Yasukuni Shrine, which honors war dead including war criminals.

Kihara, Japan's defense minister, visited the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender, defending the visit as a tribute to those who sacrificed their lives.

Yet, the complex relationship between these two neighboring countries is paramount, and both need the United States to facilitate their cooperation against the China-led trio.

With security fears intensifying, the geopolitical stakes are steep. If Beijing acts on its threats regarding Taiwan, it would deliver a significant economic and political setback to the U.S., with ramifications reverberating throughout Asia. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the reemergence of Russian influence only amplify the urgency for a coordinated response.

The Biden administration's diplomatic efforts aimed to create a network of military alliances reminiscent of NATO in East Asia, with China as the analogous threat to the Soviet Union. However, formal alliances such as NATO remain undesirable for South Korea and Japan, who express hesitation to be aligned too closely militarily.

For Japan to become more integrated into this alliance fabric, it must assume an equal partnership with the U.S. and others, similar to Germany’s position. However, the U.S. remains reluctant to revisit the postwar security arrangements that currently keep Japan somewhat constrained.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba once contemplated the notion of an “Asian NATO” and was made to retract those thoughts soon after taking office in September.

For U.S. officials, these political distractions are less pertinent. In practical terms, significant shifts have already begun, with countries arming themselves more robustly than they did a decade ago. As defense spending escalates, Japan’s declining population complicates its military expansion. Investment is focused on acquiring American long-range technologies and enhancing its naval capabilities, with hopes that Japan's forces could provide critical deterrents in the event of conflict in Taiwan.

Earlier this year, the U.S. elevated the command of forces in Japan and committed to constructing a new command center, which some consider “the largest change in our force structure” in 60 years.

Plans are in motion for greater institutional collaboration, including discussions for establishing a trilateral secretariat, though this does not signify a comprehensive alliance like NATO.

The historical grievances in East Asia continue to be potent influences on present-day interactions, exacerbated by China's role in promoting animosity toward Japan among younger generations. Amid increased tensions, there have been incidents targeting Japanese citizens in China, illustrating the volatile undercurrents of this regional discord.

Furthermore, both Japan and South Korea are economically intertwined with China, which offers Beijing leverage over them.

As the U.S. endeavors to fortify their relationship, Japan and South Korea will continue to rely primarily on Washington for reassurance regarding American commitment and power in the region.

“Beijing wants to send a signal that the U.S. is unable to support treaty allies in the region, and to send a signal to Taiwan, to portray us as hollow allies,” Pottinger remarked. “Xi has led himself into believing that America is in irrevocable decline and that China and its allies will paper the world in chaos.”

Anna Muller contributed to this report for TROIB News