The international climate competition is nearly finished, with China in the lead
China's leadership in clean energy technology has enabled it to strengthen its influence over developing nations, overshadowing the relatively modest initiatives put forth by the U.S. and Europe.
Through decades of strategic investment in the clean energy sector, Beijing has forged strong business relationships with governments across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Notably, China does so without the labor and environmental protections that the United States and European Union typically advocate. These countries have aligned themselves with China during disputes regarding U.S. and European trade policies, as well as demands for rich nations to enhance their international climate aid commitments.
As President-elect Donald Trump readies to take office, with intentions of withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement, some diplomats at the ongoing U.N.-sponsored talks in Azerbaijan expressed hopes that China would step up to lead with significant commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Trump has also indicated plans to dismantle the clean energy policies of the Biden administration that aim to diminish China's dominance in key technological sectors.
“We will need China’s continued leadership,” stated U.N. climate chief Simon Stiell during the COP29 summit, which is expected to conclude this weekend. He urged Beijing to show other nations that “stronger targets drive investment,” a sentiment that could parallel a pitch for President Joe Biden’s substantial clean energy initiatives.
China has indicated its willingness to respond but has not provided specific commitments.
“China has contributed in addressing climate change,” Chinese Vice Minister of Ecology and Environment Zhao Yingmin stated in an interview. “But in the future, China will do our best to contribute more.”
China's current strategy has only solidified its global standing, often countering the climate objectives of Washington and Brussels. The country has established dominance over the essential minerals and technologies that underpin electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and clean energy infrastructure. An overwhelming majority of critical clean technology resources are produced in China, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, including 86 percent of battery, 81 percent of solar, 64 percent of wind, and 69 percent of electrolyzer technologies.
This dominance enables China to strengthen relationships with developing nations, overshadowing the more limited initiatives from the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, China harnesses more renewable energy capacity than any other nation, with a construction pipeline twice that of the rest of the world, even as it maintains a heavy reliance on coal.
Experts predict that Trump’s anticipated pivot to an “America First” approach, combined with the financial challenges faced by European governments, will further empower China, not just in climate policy but across broader economic and security issues. This situation could result in global climate initiatives aligning more closely with China’s objectives, benefiting its clean technology sector while allowing fossil fuel dependence to persist for years.
“With the U.S. out, China will step up — but in a very different way,” said Jonathan Pershing, a climate negotiator in previous U.S. administrations. He remarked that China’s leadership style is more “parochial” compared to that of the United States, which may lead to less transparency regarding nations’ carbon reduction efforts.
Trump’s intention to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement a second time would “cede leadership to China, the very thing that he says we don’t want to do,” warned former Biden climate envoy John Kerry in a Bloomberg interview. “He would diminish the ability of the world to be able to respond to this existential crisis.”
The U.S. and EU have consistently urged China to accelerate its transition from fossil fuels. As the top global climate polluter, China is responsible for 30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions but has often resisted pressures for more rapid action.
Instead, China aims for a gradual phase-out of oil, natural gas, and coal — both domestically and for emerging economies like India, essential for achieving targets to limit global warming. President Xi Jinping’s administration has cautioned the U.S. against trying to “contain” China, deeming it “unwise, unacceptable and bound to fail.”
Two new developments complicate efforts to persuade China to commit to more aggressive reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, according to Kate Logan, director of the China Climate Hub and climate diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute: a slowdown in China’s economic expansion and rising energy consumption.
John Podesta, the Biden administration’s point person on international climate negotiations, is applying public pressure on China to enhance its emissions-reduction goals for the upcoming decade, even as Trump is likely to dismiss any new U.S. climate targets proposed by the Biden administration.
“I think they can be more ambitious,” Podesta remarked about China at the start of the global climate talks. “So they have an important role to play, and I hope that they play it.”
Strapped for resources to invest in other nations, U.S. and G7 leaders are sending conflicting messages in an attempt to diminish China’s influence. They caution nations against blindly accepting Chinese investments, highlighting potential foreign policy risks and hidden costs, such as the transfer of control over natural resources or infrastructure. In October, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock warned island nations facing rising sea levels to consider the terms attached to Chinese investments, which could lead to increased Chinese influence or military presences in the Pacific.
Simultaneously, the U.S. and its allies have criticized China for not providing sufficient low-cost financial support to help developing nations achieve their climate objectives.
At COP29, discussions focused on the need for over $1 trillion annually in climate financing from wealthy countries, with the U.S. and EU advocating for China’s inclusion in these funding efforts. However, China has pushed back, citing a 1992 U.N. treaty that classifies it as a developing nation.
Senior Biden administration officials have stated that if China begins contributing to climate finance, it should adhere to similar transparency, labor, and environmental standards as the U.S. and others.
The U.S. and EU also appeal to developing nations on values-based grounds, asserting that their investments will better support local jobs, protect the environment, and alleviate debt burdens compared to Chinese deals. These arguments echo those directed at the incoming Trump administration.
“We cannot cede the playing field to China, to our competitors, who would bring a different vision into these transactions, into these economic spaces,” emphasized Jake Levine, the director for climate and energy on Biden’s National Security Council, in a recent briefing.
Despite these appeals, it is undeniable that China has emerged as a significant source of climate finance during a critical period. Chinese government officials have reported providing developing countries with nearly $25 billion since 2016, marking the first instance of the government disclosing such figures.
Independent assessments corroborate these estimates, with the Center for Global Development estimating that China contributed $3.8 billion annually from 2013 to 2022, while the World Resources Institute placed its contributions at $4.5 billion per year. In fact, from 2017 to 2021, China’s climate finance roughly doubled that of the U.S. for direct lending between nations, although the U.S. contributed more overall when factoring in flows from multilateral development banks.
Interest in financing clean energy projects has surged in China over the past year, particularly in Africa, where Chinese state-owned enterprises were involved in 51 of 55 solar and energy projects since 2021. Chinese entities are projected to assist in installing 224 gigawatts of clean energy capacity on the continent by 2030, according to consulting firm Development Reimagined. Furthermore, Chinese firms' overseas investments in clean technology surpassed $100 billion since 2023, as reported by Australian research firm Climate Energy Finance.
In contrast, Washington and Brussels often lack the financial resources to effectively compete with China. Their initiatives typically involve more complex arrangements, emphasizing environmental, safety, labor, and transparency standards that China frequently overlooks.
“Compared to the Chinese, we're really not in the game in Africa and probably parts of Latin America,” commented Todd Stern, who played a key role in negotiating the Paris climate agreement during the Obama administration. “The Chinese show up with a check and the U.S. shows up with a checklist.”
Joseph Kobusheshe, a director at the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, noted that working with China is often smoother due to reduced activist backlash against its investments.
“The Chinese respond differently to some of those pressures,” he said. “I think they come in handy in such circumstances.”
To counterbalance China’s dominance, the U.S. and EU have turned to trade measures while attempting to build support for green transitions domestically. The EU is implementing a carbon border adjustment mechanism to tax imported raw materials produced with unsustainable practices, while both the U.S. and EU are advocating for tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.
However, these policies have also forged closer ties between Beijing and several emerging economies.
At COP29, Brazil, South Africa, and India joined China in a formal statement opposing unilateral trade actions, arguing that such protectionism raises costs for deploying green technologies. Initial draft language from the climate talks criticized Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, requesting developed countries to discontinue clean energy subsidies exceeding $100 billion annually by 2028. This provision ultimately did not appear in subsequent drafts.
Chinese leaders “believe they will only take this as a competition when they see the competitor on the stage,” said Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “And so far, they do not even see a competitor.”
Karl Mathiesen and Zia Weise contributed to this report.
Ian Smith for TROIB News