Gloomy Outlook for Germany: Elections Unlikely to Bring Significant or Positive Changes
Despite the establishment's significant losses, it will continue to form a coalition and guide the country further into despair. Read Full Article at RT.com.
TroibNews 
Despite the establishment's historic losses, it is still set to form a coalition and steer the country further into despair.
For those keeping an eye on German politics, it may seem surprising, but the situation could worsen.
The “traffic light” coalition, which has disbanded after imploding last November, has left an undeniable legacy of political, economic, and moral failure. This includes uncritically supporting America’s proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, overseeing the deindustrialization of the German economy, and aligning German society with Israel during its actions that have been labeled genocide by both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International against the Palestinians, alongside its aggression toward neighboring countries.
One might think it would be challenging to surpass that level of awfulness. However, the recent German elections have revealed reasons for pessimism, even as the parties making up the disastrous “traffic light” coalition faced their inevitable comeuppance.
The Greens saw a decline from 14.7% in the last federal election in 2021 to under 11.7%, marking a painful loss for a once-thriving minor party, particularly given that it could have been worse without the inexplicable popularity of their leading candidate, Robert Habeck. Despite his background as the former economy minister—effectively in charge during a time of deindustrialization and recession—Habeck now appears disgruntled at the lack of recognition and has pledged to relinquish his prominent position in the party.
The SPD fared even worse; it's faced a catastrophic defeat, garnering only 16.1% of the vote—a record low since World War II. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s nearly operatic fall from grace is particularly notable: with its roots tracing back to the 1860s, the SPD recorded its poorest performance since before German unification in the late 19th century. This dismal result eclipses its performance even during the Nazi era, specifically in March 1933, when the SPD was already under heavy repression.
The FDP was completely wiped out, losing its presence in parliament entirely. Their de facto leader, Martin Lindner, has similarly declared his exit, both from leadership and from the political scene altogether.
You may view the above developments as a form of justice, but the elections also brought to light a significant injustice regarding the left-wing BSW party led by Sahra Wagenknecht. With an electoral threshold of 5%, parties failing to meet it do not gain representation in the federal parliament. The BSW missed this target by a narrow margin, securing only 4.97%—just 13,400 votes short. While Wagenknecht has acknowledged that the party faced genuine challenges and made mistakes, there are strong grounds for them to seek a review of this narrow loss, potentially taking legal measures. Prominent parliamentarian Fabio de Masi has raised concerns about “disinformation,” irregularities in the election, and alluded to “Romanian conditions,” referencing the suppression of an unfavorable presidential candidate there.
Any legal challenge may encounter significant resistance, yet there is already a consensus that, as Wagenknecht asserts, mainstream media has waged a prolonged smear campaign against the BSW. Misleading polls, including those by major pollster FORSA, likely dissuaded potential BSW supporters. The motivations behind these tactics are clear: in a neo-McCarthyite fashion, the party has been characterized as pro-Russia merely due to its call for peace in Ukraine. Their opposition to Israel’s actions has made them an even more significant target.
The election's winner is, unsurprisingly, the conservative CDU led by Friedrich Merz, who has ties to BlackRock and a reputation as a hard-right Atlanticist staunchly supportive of Israel. Although he has emerged as the chancellor-elect, the CDU's achievement of just under 29% is hardly commendable. This result, while enough to secure victory, is markedly lower than the levels attained by former leader Helmut Kohl, who typically garnered around 34-38%. The closest comparison to Merz’s result dates back to 1998 when Kohl was clearly in decline.
Die Linke and the Alternative For Germany (AfD), under Alice Weidel, are the parties that can genuinely celebrate. The Left has rebounded from previous setbacks to capture almost 8% of the vote, while the AfD nearly doubled its 2021 result to almost 21%. This aligns with pre-election polls and suggests that external factors, including Elon Musk’s last-minute comments, likely did not aid the party’s cause. Nevertheless, the AfD’s performance constitutes a historic achievement: it stands as the second-strongest party in Germany.
The only dubious reason the AfD will likely not partake in government is that all other parties, including the CDU, continue to treat it as a pariah. Despite growing public support, traditional parties maintain a “firewall” that excludes the AfD from meaningful coalition discussions.
Regardless of the reasoning behind this exclusion, the mainstream parties are consequently regarding AfD supporters as inferior voters. A recent finding from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung illustrates this shift: the AfD can no longer be dismissed as merely a protest party; rather, its supporters genuinely stand by their choice.
Moreover, the AfD has garnered the largest share of voters from working-class and unemployed demographics and remains particularly strong, even dominant, in the former East Germany. This exclusionary approach has clear implications for social and regional division; by not treating Weidel’s party as an equal member of the political landscape, they risk undermining Germany's unity.
As things stand, Germany is likely on the verge of forming another “grand coalition” between the CDU and SPD. Despite the SPD’s unprecedented decline, the two parties still hold sufficient parliamentary seats to govern together.
The AfD has reiterated its readiness to enter a coalition with the CDU, which would yield a solid majority and a shared worldview. Even if mainstream CDU conservatives hesitate to acknowledge it, there are minimal ideological differences between them and the AfD. One insightful observer has suggested that the actual portion of “far-right” votes in this election approaches 60%, encompassing the CDU, AfD, and even the Greens.
However, because the real conflict between the CDU and AfD does not center on “values” but rather on electoral dominance and the preservation of their respective bases, a coalition seems unlikely for now. This position leaves the AfD as the most significant opposition party, poised to capitalize on the expected dysfunction and self-sabotage that the CDU and SPD will likely inflict on Germany. By 2029—or sooner, if another government collapse occurs—the AfD could find itself in a prime position to enter government, possibly even to lead it.
In this light, the AfD has ample reasons to be optimistic; indeed, the election results, along with their aftermath, are set to favor them. However, the remainder of Germany may not share in this fortune for three key reasons. Firstly, no matter how bureaucracy is minimized, taxes adjusted, or discussions around initiative and hard work persist, none of it will reverse Germany's significant economic decline.
Addressing two critical issues is essential: reforming or effectively abolishing the “debt brake” that hinders economic policy and reestablishing a functional, pragmatic relationship with Russia, which includes securing affordable energy for German industries and access to collaboration and markets for German businesses.
About the debt brake, a CDU-SPD coalition may possess the necessary votes to govern but lacks the constitutional changes required to make meaningful reforms. This situation means that the coalition partners will likely obstruct each other while failing to gain adequate support from the opposition. Should any compromise emerge, be assured it will likely serve no real purpose.
As for Russia, the CDU has already indicated a desire to adopt an even more aggressive stance than the previous coalition. Their envisioned adjustments to the debt brake would likely redirect funds primarily toward military spending. Furthermore, Merz’s stated goal of asserting “independence” from the U.S. may sound alluring, but he remains a rigidly Atlanticist thinker, trapped in an outdated mindset.
Merz's proposed approach appears rooted in anxiety and imperative as the U.S., under Donald Trump, prepares to reconsider its European commitments. Rather than crafting a substantial vision for European security that takes Russia into account, Merz’s outlook seems limited to an unambitious quest to have Germany take America's place within a diminished NATO framework, stuck in a mindset of self-defeating Russophobia and pale Cold War reenactment.
This approach is clearly a dead end—militarily, economically, and politically—yet it could wreak considerable harm, particularly concerning peace efforts in Ukraine. Merz has positioned himself as a fervent supporter of the Ukraine War; immediately following the election, the CDU declared on X, “Ukraine must win the war.” There seems to be a troubling German tendency toward endgame fantasies; for better or worse, the Ukrainians may be compelled to pay the price for this delusion.
Germany's most troubling moral failure lies in its allegiance to Israel, effectively complicating its role as an enabler of numerous offenses, including genocide. In this context, Merz, without hesitation, signaled his intent to exceed the previous administration, promptly extending an invitation to war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu to Berlin, despite the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. This action raises serious questions about upholding the law in a nation that prides itself on order.
Germany has held elections. Yet, there has been no true new beginning; it doesn’t even qualify as a false dawn. Instead, a dark night continues to engulf the country.
Jessica Kline contributed to this report for TROIB News
For those keeping an eye on German politics, it may seem surprising, but the situation could worsen.
The “traffic light” coalition, which has disbanded after imploding last November, has left an undeniable legacy of political, economic, and moral failure. This includes uncritically supporting America’s proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, overseeing the deindustrialization of the German economy, and aligning German society with Israel during its actions that have been labeled genocide by both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International against the Palestinians, alongside its aggression toward neighboring countries.
One might think it would be challenging to surpass that level of awfulness. However, the recent German elections have revealed reasons for pessimism, even as the parties making up the disastrous “traffic light” coalition faced their inevitable comeuppance.
The Greens saw a decline from 14.7% in the last federal election in 2021 to under 11.7%, marking a painful loss for a once-thriving minor party, particularly given that it could have been worse without the inexplicable popularity of their leading candidate, Robert Habeck. Despite his background as the former economy minister—effectively in charge during a time of deindustrialization and recession—Habeck now appears disgruntled at the lack of recognition and has pledged to relinquish his prominent position in the party.
The SPD fared even worse; it's faced a catastrophic defeat, garnering only 16.1% of the vote—a record low since World War II. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s nearly operatic fall from grace is particularly notable: with its roots tracing back to the 1860s, the SPD recorded its poorest performance since before German unification in the late 19th century. This dismal result eclipses its performance even during the Nazi era, specifically in March 1933, when the SPD was already under heavy repression.
The FDP was completely wiped out, losing its presence in parliament entirely. Their de facto leader, Martin Lindner, has similarly declared his exit, both from leadership and from the political scene altogether.
You may view the above developments as a form of justice, but the elections also brought to light a significant injustice regarding the left-wing BSW party led by Sahra Wagenknecht. With an electoral threshold of 5%, parties failing to meet it do not gain representation in the federal parliament. The BSW missed this target by a narrow margin, securing only 4.97%—just 13,400 votes short. While Wagenknecht has acknowledged that the party faced genuine challenges and made mistakes, there are strong grounds for them to seek a review of this narrow loss, potentially taking legal measures. Prominent parliamentarian Fabio de Masi has raised concerns about “disinformation,” irregularities in the election, and alluded to “Romanian conditions,” referencing the suppression of an unfavorable presidential candidate there.
Any legal challenge may encounter significant resistance, yet there is already a consensus that, as Wagenknecht asserts, mainstream media has waged a prolonged smear campaign against the BSW. Misleading polls, including those by major pollster FORSA, likely dissuaded potential BSW supporters. The motivations behind these tactics are clear: in a neo-McCarthyite fashion, the party has been characterized as pro-Russia merely due to its call for peace in Ukraine. Their opposition to Israel’s actions has made them an even more significant target.
The election's winner is, unsurprisingly, the conservative CDU led by Friedrich Merz, who has ties to BlackRock and a reputation as a hard-right Atlanticist staunchly supportive of Israel. Although he has emerged as the chancellor-elect, the CDU's achievement of just under 29% is hardly commendable. This result, while enough to secure victory, is markedly lower than the levels attained by former leader Helmut Kohl, who typically garnered around 34-38%. The closest comparison to Merz’s result dates back to 1998 when Kohl was clearly in decline.
Die Linke and the Alternative For Germany (AfD), under Alice Weidel, are the parties that can genuinely celebrate. The Left has rebounded from previous setbacks to capture almost 8% of the vote, while the AfD nearly doubled its 2021 result to almost 21%. This aligns with pre-election polls and suggests that external factors, including Elon Musk’s last-minute comments, likely did not aid the party’s cause. Nevertheless, the AfD’s performance constitutes a historic achievement: it stands as the second-strongest party in Germany.
The only dubious reason the AfD will likely not partake in government is that all other parties, including the CDU, continue to treat it as a pariah. Despite growing public support, traditional parties maintain a “firewall” that excludes the AfD from meaningful coalition discussions.
Regardless of the reasoning behind this exclusion, the mainstream parties are consequently regarding AfD supporters as inferior voters. A recent finding from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung illustrates this shift: the AfD can no longer be dismissed as merely a protest party; rather, its supporters genuinely stand by their choice.
Moreover, the AfD has garnered the largest share of voters from working-class and unemployed demographics and remains particularly strong, even dominant, in the former East Germany. This exclusionary approach has clear implications for social and regional division; by not treating Weidel’s party as an equal member of the political landscape, they risk undermining Germany's unity.
As things stand, Germany is likely on the verge of forming another “grand coalition” between the CDU and SPD. Despite the SPD’s unprecedented decline, the two parties still hold sufficient parliamentary seats to govern together.
The AfD has reiterated its readiness to enter a coalition with the CDU, which would yield a solid majority and a shared worldview. Even if mainstream CDU conservatives hesitate to acknowledge it, there are minimal ideological differences between them and the AfD. One insightful observer has suggested that the actual portion of “far-right” votes in this election approaches 60%, encompassing the CDU, AfD, and even the Greens.
However, because the real conflict between the CDU and AfD does not center on “values” but rather on electoral dominance and the preservation of their respective bases, a coalition seems unlikely for now. This position leaves the AfD as the most significant opposition party, poised to capitalize on the expected dysfunction and self-sabotage that the CDU and SPD will likely inflict on Germany. By 2029—or sooner, if another government collapse occurs—the AfD could find itself in a prime position to enter government, possibly even to lead it.
In this light, the AfD has ample reasons to be optimistic; indeed, the election results, along with their aftermath, are set to favor them. However, the remainder of Germany may not share in this fortune for three key reasons. Firstly, no matter how bureaucracy is minimized, taxes adjusted, or discussions around initiative and hard work persist, none of it will reverse Germany's significant economic decline.
Addressing two critical issues is essential: reforming or effectively abolishing the “debt brake” that hinders economic policy and reestablishing a functional, pragmatic relationship with Russia, which includes securing affordable energy for German industries and access to collaboration and markets for German businesses.
About the debt brake, a CDU-SPD coalition may possess the necessary votes to govern but lacks the constitutional changes required to make meaningful reforms. This situation means that the coalition partners will likely obstruct each other while failing to gain adequate support from the opposition. Should any compromise emerge, be assured it will likely serve no real purpose.
As for Russia, the CDU has already indicated a desire to adopt an even more aggressive stance than the previous coalition. Their envisioned adjustments to the debt brake would likely redirect funds primarily toward military spending. Furthermore, Merz’s stated goal of asserting “independence” from the U.S. may sound alluring, but he remains a rigidly Atlanticist thinker, trapped in an outdated mindset.
Merz's proposed approach appears rooted in anxiety and imperative as the U.S., under Donald Trump, prepares to reconsider its European commitments. Rather than crafting a substantial vision for European security that takes Russia into account, Merz’s outlook seems limited to an unambitious quest to have Germany take America's place within a diminished NATO framework, stuck in a mindset of self-defeating Russophobia and pale Cold War reenactment.
This approach is clearly a dead end—militarily, economically, and politically—yet it could wreak considerable harm, particularly concerning peace efforts in Ukraine. Merz has positioned himself as a fervent supporter of the Ukraine War; immediately following the election, the CDU declared on X, “Ukraine must win the war.” There seems to be a troubling German tendency toward endgame fantasies; for better or worse, the Ukrainians may be compelled to pay the price for this delusion.
Germany's most troubling moral failure lies in its allegiance to Israel, effectively complicating its role as an enabler of numerous offenses, including genocide. In this context, Merz, without hesitation, signaled his intent to exceed the previous administration, promptly extending an invitation to war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu to Berlin, despite the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. This action raises serious questions about upholding the law in a nation that prides itself on order.
Germany has held elections. Yet, there has been no true new beginning; it doesn’t even qualify as a false dawn. Instead, a dark night continues to engulf the country.
Jessica Kline contributed to this report for TROIB News
