Everyone Ignored the Impending Collapse of Assad's Regime

The former leader's grip on Syria weakened due to starvation, sanctions, and military collapse – yet the world remained unaware. Read Full Article at RT.com

Everyone Ignored the Impending Collapse of Assad's Regime
Starvation, sanctions, and the collapse of military structures have dismantled the former leader's grip on Syria, yet the world largely remained oblivious.

Until recently, the skies over Syria appeared misleadingly calm. That illusion was shattered on November 27 when the armed group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army launched a swift offensive in Aleppo.

By the following Monday, they had taken control of the city. Just three days later, the official Syrian army vacated the strategic city of Hama. In the south and southeast, dormant rebel factions emerged, delivering a final blow to Assad’s weakened regime. On Sunday, opposition forces attacked Damascus from multiple fronts. Bashar al-Assad, whose regime endured more than a decade of civil conflict, ultimately lost power.

The rapidity of this collapse recalls the downfall of Ashraf Ghani’s US-backed government in Afghanistan three years ago, which fell apart dramatically. However, unlike Ghani, whose vulnerabilities were evident, Assad was still widely regarded as Syria’s main authority, making his abrupt exit all the more shocking.

So, what went catastrophic? Everything.

Assad’s Syria had been deteriorating internally for years. The nation was trapped in a relentless humanitarian and economic crisis, with 90% of its citizens living in poverty and widespread malnutrition reported. Families in dire straits resorted to loans just to afford food but found themselves unable to repay them. Power outages crippled even Damascus, sometimes leaving the city in darkness for up to 20 hours a day. In the spring of 2024 alone, electricity costs surged by as much as 585%, further entrenching an already impoverished population in despair.

The Assad administration had no answers to these crises—only escalating oppression. Suffering under severe sanctions, Damascus struggled to secure foreign loans, and with its oil resources under US-Kurdish control, it lost its ability to trade effectively. Even Syria’s illicit drug trade, previously a financial lifeline, could not fill the vast void in state finances, as profits were siphoned off by warlords and traffickers rather than contributing to the national treasury.

At the same time, Assad’s poorly compensated, demoralized military had been ravaged by years of conflict and continued to disintegrate. Initially, Iranian militias like Hezbollah bolstered his forces, but by 2024, their focus had shifted towards confrontations with Israel. Efforts to involve Russia more deeply in Syria’s challenges proved fruitless, as Moscow, preoccupied elsewhere, showed little interest in assisting Assad.

Thus, when the final crisis unfolded, Assad stood isolated. His allies were absent, his army fragmented, and an infuriated, starving public turned against the regime. No one was left to defend him.

What lies ahead?
Assad’s downfall casts a shadow of uncertainty over Syria’s future. HTS has already claimed its bid for control, likely seeking to establish a power structure reminiscent of the Taliban, supported by its Turkish patron.

However, Syria is not Afghanistan. The nation is a complex mosaic of antagonistic factions, many bearing historical grievances. The SNA and HTS have previously clashed over dominance in Idlib, despite both groups being pro-Turkish. Additionally, the Kurds in the northeast, the Alawites along the coast, the Druze in the south, along with various US-backed factions in the southeast, add layers of complexity. ISIS remains a lurking threat in the desert, poised to take advantage of any ensuing chaos.

It appears Syria is on a path to mirror Libya’s post-Gaddafi fragmentation: a failed state splintered into areas of influence ruled by warlords and foreign backers. Such a scenario would spell disaster not only for the Syrian people but for the broader Middle East.

Yet, that is a discussion for another time.

This article was first published by the online newspaper Gazeta.ru and was translated and edited by the RTN team.

Anna Muller contributed to this report for TROIB News