Dmitry Trenin Suggests a European Area That Might Follow Ukraine's Path
The ongoing conflict between Russia and the West is unlikely to conclude simply because Kiev ceases to serve as a proxy. Read Full Article at RT.com
TroibNews 
The ongoing tensions between Russia and the West extend far beyond the "Ukraine crisis," as the conflict has become a global issue affecting numerous sectors including finance, pharmaceuticals, and sports across various regions.
Currently, Europe stands as the focal point of this confrontation, particularly in the Baltic region, where tensions are escalating. This raises the question in both Russia and the West: Could this area be the next battlefield?
In Western Europe and North America, there has been speculation that after a potential Russian victory in Ukraine, the military could advance further into the Baltic states and Poland. This narrative seems aimed at persuading Western Europeans that failing to fully support Kiev could result in warfare on their own soil.
It's noteworthy that within the EU, few dare to openly consider whether Moscow actually desires a direct military clash with NATO, or what its objectives are in such a scenario. Even raising these subjects risks being labeled as promoting Russian propaganda.
Russia has taken note of inflammatory comments from neighboring countries, particularly from Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland, regarding the potential for blockading the Kaliningrad exclave and restricting Russia's access to the Gulf of Finland. While many of these statements come from retired officials, some active politicians and military figures have also echoed similar sentiments.
Such threats do not incite fear among Russians, as significant geopolitical decisions are typically made in Washington, not in places like Warsaw or Tallinn, though the situation remains serious.
The Baltic Sea region lost its reputation as Europe’s most stable and peaceful area many years ago. With NATO expansion—including Poland (1999), the Baltic states (2004), Finland (2023), and Sweden (2024)—the area has been referred to as a "NATO lake" in Brussels. This shift has put NATO forces just a two-hour drive from St. Petersburg, significantly increasing the direct contact line when Finland joined the alliance.
NATO has not only expanded closer to Russian borders; it is also enhancing its military readiness. The establishment of quick-access corridors for NATO forces, the construction and upgrading of military bases, an increase in US and allied presence, and the intensification of military drills all contribute to a more precarious situation. The U.S. plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany by 2026 echoes the Euro-missile crisis of the early 1980s, a time widely regarded as one of the Cold War's most dangerous phases.
In light of these developments, Moscow is reinforcing its military deterrence strategy. Steps have already been implemented, such as reconstituting the Leningrad Military District and creating new military formations. The integration of military capabilities between Russia and Belarus has advanced, including the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil and recent exercises involving non-strategic nuclear forces. Official warnings indicate that under certain circumstances, NATO military installations could become legitimate targets, with a revised nuclear doctrine enhancing Russia’s deterrent capabilities.
There is a hope that the U.S. recognizes that any naval blockade of Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg would act as a catalyst for war. The current American leadership appears to be averse to engaging in a significant direct conflict with Russia. However, history illustrates that such conflicts can arise unexpectedly. The U.S. strategy of gradual escalation to strategically undermine Russia in the proxy war in Ukraine risks triggering an uncontrollable series of events.
Moreover, Washington's actions may inadvertently embolden reckless rhetoric and behavior from its allies, leading them to provoke Moscow and potentially draw the U.S. and Russia into direct conflict. There is a necessity for the U.S. to balance its instincts with a sense of self-preservation.
While hopes remain just that, it's evident that Russia has exhausted its capacity for issuing verbal warnings. The hostile actions of adversaries require decisive responses. This includes potential threats from airfields in NATO countries, possible attempts by Estonia and Finland to hinder maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland, Lithuania's disruptions to rail connections with Kaliningrad, and significant risks to Belarus. Taking early, tough measures against these scenarios could help avert dangerous escalations.
It’s crucial to understand that the confrontation between Russia and the collective West will persist beyond the cessation of active military engagements in Ukraine. A solid divide now exists from the Arctic to the Black Sea, rendering the concept of European security obsolete. Instead, Russia may need to rely on its own resources for security in what could be a prolonged period of instability, with the Baltic region likely to remain a heavily militarized area hostile to Russia. The stability of this situation will largely depend on the outcomes of the Ukraine operation.
This article was first published by Profile.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team.
Camille Lefevre contributed to this report for TROIB News
Currently, Europe stands as the focal point of this confrontation, particularly in the Baltic region, where tensions are escalating. This raises the question in both Russia and the West: Could this area be the next battlefield?
In Western Europe and North America, there has been speculation that after a potential Russian victory in Ukraine, the military could advance further into the Baltic states and Poland. This narrative seems aimed at persuading Western Europeans that failing to fully support Kiev could result in warfare on their own soil.
It's noteworthy that within the EU, few dare to openly consider whether Moscow actually desires a direct military clash with NATO, or what its objectives are in such a scenario. Even raising these subjects risks being labeled as promoting Russian propaganda.
Russia has taken note of inflammatory comments from neighboring countries, particularly from Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland, regarding the potential for blockading the Kaliningrad exclave and restricting Russia's access to the Gulf of Finland. While many of these statements come from retired officials, some active politicians and military figures have also echoed similar sentiments.
Such threats do not incite fear among Russians, as significant geopolitical decisions are typically made in Washington, not in places like Warsaw or Tallinn, though the situation remains serious.
The Baltic Sea region lost its reputation as Europe’s most stable and peaceful area many years ago. With NATO expansion—including Poland (1999), the Baltic states (2004), Finland (2023), and Sweden (2024)—the area has been referred to as a "NATO lake" in Brussels. This shift has put NATO forces just a two-hour drive from St. Petersburg, significantly increasing the direct contact line when Finland joined the alliance.
NATO has not only expanded closer to Russian borders; it is also enhancing its military readiness. The establishment of quick-access corridors for NATO forces, the construction and upgrading of military bases, an increase in US and allied presence, and the intensification of military drills all contribute to a more precarious situation. The U.S. plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany by 2026 echoes the Euro-missile crisis of the early 1980s, a time widely regarded as one of the Cold War's most dangerous phases.
In light of these developments, Moscow is reinforcing its military deterrence strategy. Steps have already been implemented, such as reconstituting the Leningrad Military District and creating new military formations. The integration of military capabilities between Russia and Belarus has advanced, including the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil and recent exercises involving non-strategic nuclear forces. Official warnings indicate that under certain circumstances, NATO military installations could become legitimate targets, with a revised nuclear doctrine enhancing Russia’s deterrent capabilities.
There is a hope that the U.S. recognizes that any naval blockade of Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg would act as a catalyst for war. The current American leadership appears to be averse to engaging in a significant direct conflict with Russia. However, history illustrates that such conflicts can arise unexpectedly. The U.S. strategy of gradual escalation to strategically undermine Russia in the proxy war in Ukraine risks triggering an uncontrollable series of events.
Moreover, Washington's actions may inadvertently embolden reckless rhetoric and behavior from its allies, leading them to provoke Moscow and potentially draw the U.S. and Russia into direct conflict. There is a necessity for the U.S. to balance its instincts with a sense of self-preservation.
While hopes remain just that, it's evident that Russia has exhausted its capacity for issuing verbal warnings. The hostile actions of adversaries require decisive responses. This includes potential threats from airfields in NATO countries, possible attempts by Estonia and Finland to hinder maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland, Lithuania's disruptions to rail connections with Kaliningrad, and significant risks to Belarus. Taking early, tough measures against these scenarios could help avert dangerous escalations.
It’s crucial to understand that the confrontation between Russia and the collective West will persist beyond the cessation of active military engagements in Ukraine. A solid divide now exists from the Arctic to the Black Sea, rendering the concept of European security obsolete. Instead, Russia may need to rely on its own resources for security in what could be a prolonged period of instability, with the Baltic region likely to remain a heavily militarized area hostile to Russia. The stability of this situation will largely depend on the outcomes of the Ukraine operation.
This article was first published by Profile.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team.
Camille Lefevre contributed to this report for TROIB News
